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Preface
The most casual of readers of current events
must be impressed with the amount of space given
Latin America affairs in the many forms of popular
publicationso The field is charged with a political
emotion that could be most disastrous for both the
United States, and the republics themselves. For
despite the impressive state of private and Congression-
al literature on the subject of United States relations
with Latin America, there is lacking the substantial
direction of a .coordinated, organized policy by the
United States towards the area in general, and the
separate republics in particularo
The United States Senate has recently published
the most reliable summary of opinions about the state
of affairs as a guide to its own action. It is not
surprising that the common problem is one of informa-
tione For some strange reason, the foreign policy of
the United States has not reflected "What" the problem
of Latin America really is.
It is our purpose here to deal with one side of
the coin of this "problem", economic development. We
are considering too only one of the republics. I t is
a real challenge to find in print today any serious study
on Latin America that does not attempt to handle one or
III
more of the republics at the same time, while dis-
cussing one or more of the problems of Latin America.
This desire for oversimplification is startling, and
in view of the essentially important individuality of
the Latin American republics, is bound to lead to
failures on our part if not corrected. Because of our
tendency to generalize, we feel that the Latin Americans
must sense a lack of serious purpose on our part.
The Republic of Chile represents a good selection
for such a necessarily brief study as this paper will
beo For Chile is the most remotely located of the
republics in terms of distance from the United States.
Yet her climatic location, and elongated geographical
situation, along with the ninety-five percent European
population mixture, tend to create similarities to the
United States that make her problems understandable
to us. Too, the central problem during the post-war
period in Chile has been inflation, one which the entire
world has closely watched.
We will attempt, perhaps inadequately, to set down
an organized body of related and unrelated economic
development programs during the period of 1952-1960, as
utilized by the Chilean Republic. The relationship of
these programs to United States foreign policy will be
indicated. Because of the scope and seriousness of the
IV
economic problems facing Chile, we have attempted to
direct our attention on as wide a scope as possible in
the review. There is no claim here to ward stressing
anyone item over anothero Rather, in presenting the
activities for economic development by one of the
republics, perhaps one of our most important friends
in Latin America, to reflect on a course of future
action which our government might consider.
v
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Economic development is fast becoming a slogan of
the Cold War age. It may be that this term will be
placed along with nationalism, militarism, and imperial-
ism, as causes of future wars. The term economic develop-
ment has been popularized by the emphasis placed on
the subject of the under-developed areas of the world,
particularly in the United Nations. For the purposes
of definition, economic development will be used in
the widest sense. It applies to the policies, tech-
niqu~s, technical and scientific programs and plans,
as applied by government and non-government facilities
and apparatus, for the purposes of beginning, carrying
forward, and improving the development of a country's
gross productive capacities.
The subject of discussion here will be a considera-
tion of economic development within the framework of
United States' foreign policy, and specifically its
application in the diplomatic relations between the
United States and the Republic of Chile. The selection
of Latin America as the area for discussion is based
on its relative importance to United States' interests.
In turn, the Republic of Chile represents one of the
more advanced of the states classified in the category
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of under-developed, and perhaps the most important of
the Latin American republics weriously experimenting
in the techniques of economic development. An examination
of the subject of economic development in United States'
foreign policy as regards our diplomatic relations
with Chile, would prove valuable if found to be an
effective "new" arm of our foreign relations.
In recent years, there has been a noticeable increase
of interest in the economic history of peoplese Perhaps
the passing of the age of exploration of the earth's
surface, and the stabilization of various societies in
specific areas, has turned our attention to the poten-
tialities for economic development of these areas. It
is not so surprising therefore to view the social and
political revolutions during the past fifteen years as
basically economic upheavals. In a sense, the industrial
revolution is catching up with these under-developed
areas of the world.
At the conclusion of World War II, United States'
foreign policy faced a new challenge. War had required
an adaptation from previous policies of non-intervention
and isolation. The new challenge was one of a role
demanding free world leadership. That this challenge
was accepted is reflected in the effects upon United
States' foreign policy during the post war years.
Agreement in this area has become almost a tradition of
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bi-partisianship. There may have been political and
diplomatic differences on the types of techniques
employed and the degree of participation by United
States' leadership. But on the other hand, there has
been a very clear objective in the general aim of
military preparedness for the United States and the
recipients of our assistance. The place of economic de-
velopment has always been properly positioned in terms
of the recipient nation's ability to protect itself,
and share in free world responsibilities to keep the
peace. That this last statement be properly appreciat-
ed is essential to the context of our subject at hand.
The tenor of United States foreign policy after
World War II was keyed in direct relationship to that
of the Soviet Union. Consequent upon this was the
development of pOlicies directly related to the state
of military preparedness among the available allies, and
the economic reconstruction of all those nations willing
to shoulder the responsibility of military power. The
Marshall Plan became the keystone for the new bloc of
nations intent upon sustaining freedom from any new
aggression. One of the amazing results of the challenge
of free world leadership has been the financial invest-
ment by the United States in this single venture of
military-economic reconstruction and revitalization.
-4_
One of the by-products of this post-war foreign
policy development by the United States is the resultant
decline of our Latin American programs. It might be a
fairer interpretation to say that the decline was one
of emphasis of interest rather than emphasis of intent.
It can not be justifiably claimed that our government
became less friendly with Latin American countries or
ignored their presence in the family of nations. The
single purpose of the United States foreign policy in
the development of an allied military-economic rehab-
ilitation had its obvious limitations. Any serious
discussion about United States-Latin American relations
must evaluate the role of the United States in world
affairs, particularly in terms of the so-called Cold
War with the Soviet Union. The Cold War committments
of our government consequently delayed and postponed
action on matters of equal importance in many other
areas of the world.
The really significant issue between the United
States and Latin American republics during the post-
war period has been over the role of each in the
scheme of things for a free world. The burden of
responsibility must rest upon the United States for the
emphasis given the direction of this role. It is
apparent that the foreign policy of the United States
-5-
envisioned the role of military preparedness and strength
of its allies as the important of all factors. That
such a role would be seriously proposed to the individual
republics reflects the bankruptcy of United States
information regarding Latin America. Our persistance on
this subject has lead to the serious deterioration of
the state of good will towards the United States
enjoyed at the close of the war. The Latin American
republics,individually and as members of the Organiza-
tion of American States, have persisted in their own
view point as to what their role should be. The desire
for well-being, economic opportunity, and a sense of
security based upon individual, internal development,
has been the prevailing issue before most Latin American
leadership.
No one would question the role oi contribution of
the Latin American countries during World War II.
Evidence of the vital importance of these countries
to United States' defenses and future security is now
recorded. It may be questioned why the united States
failed after World War II, to properly acquaint itself
with the problems facing Latin America and fashion the
role of the republics in a constructive manner. In
view of the economic importance of Latin America to
the United States, it is surprising that as late as
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Dro Milton Eisenhower's 1958 good will mission to
Latin America, he would still reflect that our foreign
policy had overstressed the role of military prepared-
ness as the primary item in Latin American relations.
Students of Latin American affairs are well aware
of the tenderness of the subject of militarism in the
Western Hemisphere. If an equal emphasis had been
allowed to the desire for economic assistance and
development as was given in fact to military values,
the results for our Latin American relations might be
different today. We must accept the responsibility for
our ignorance of the facts.
To permit a proper appraisal of this question of
ilie role to be played by a Latin American republic in
the Western Hemisphere scheme of things, it would seem
proper to review an example of how the interpretation of
the role appears to one of the republics. A proper
statement of the economic facts of life concerning
one of the partners of our Western Hemispheric policy
would clarify why the role of economic strength and
forward development has been considered of prime im-
portance to Latin Americans.
In the examination that follows, United States
relations with the Republic of Chile, during the period
1952-1960, has been selected with a purpose in mind.
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This period covers the six year administration of
President Ibanez of Chile, and coincides with that of
President Eisenhower's eight years. The first year
of President Alessandri's new administration, 1959,
is briefly touched upon to reflect the intentions and
changes affected by that new Chilean leader. The
economic changes in both countries during this period
are remarkably significant, particularly insofar as
the economic changes in the United States had effects
in Chile. The struggle to curb inflation by the
government of Chile during this period has become one of
the exceptional economic battles of the post-war
period. We can not say that the example of United
States-Chilean relations during this period serves as
any barometer for our overall relations in Latin
America. But we can say that United States efforts
with this one particular republic do reflect on our
overall foreign policy approach towards Latin America.
The complexities of reviewing the current
economic and diplomatic activities between two such
nations is obvious. Current information is always
subject to too much emotion and possible inaccuracies
To avoid a charge of incompleteness, we will deal with
the subject in terms of trends toward specific results.
This is particularly important when discussing Chilean
_8-
affairs.
The Republic of Chile has been one of the most
active of the Latin American countries in testing and
trying programs aimed at its own economic development.
Chile has had a governmental tendency of learning by
doing.
This body of experience from action on national
problems has resulted in the development of a traditional
reservoir for future leaders~ Despite the desire for
immediate results and successes, a pattern of gradual
change and accomodation has tended to more permanence
a.nd stability than the short term, emergency activi'ty.
We will view the multitudinous plans and programs
initiated by the Ibanez administration, most of which
produced no immediate results. On the other hand, we
will experience a beginning of the imp~emeGtation of
many of these same plans and programs during the first
year of President Alessandri's administration. It will
appear as though a second~thOught had occurred about
their value. often the second-thought activity seemS
more deserving of support than its initial adventure.
CHAPTER II
United States Objective in Respect to Chile.
In a 1959 report on the Republic of Chile, the Depart-
mcnt of State of the United States listed four points
for consideration in respect to our objective toward
that country:
1. To maintain the respect and friendship of the
Chilean people ..
2. To be ready, whenever United States' help is
desirable and can be effective, to take action
which will contribute to Chilean economic and
political stability.
...,
.,). To win Chilean understanding of and support for
our objectives in the U. N., O.A.S., and other
international organizations.
4. To assure fair treatment for American properties
and business interests in Chile.l
It would be difficult to improve upon this diplomatic
summation. Realistically, such a statement covers the
generalities concerned in the relationships of two
friendly countries. We must turn, therefore, to other
sources for an implementation of such an objective.
Official comments on our policy towards Chile,
during the period 1952-1958, are fragmentary. They are,
at best, remarks from longer statements on Latin American
policy as a whole. One such remark comes from an assis-
tant secretary for Inter-American Affairs of the Depart-
1. Department of State, "Chile." Viashington, May 29,
1959, 13.
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ment of State, in a talk delivered during the 1952
general elections in the United States. Discussing the
"Achievements of Inter-American Cooperation," the speaker
cited Chilean cooperation with the United States, as an
exceptional example of the succesS of our program. Since
the Korean War had created new copper shortages on world
markets, the speaker urged a more moderate position on
the part of the Chilean government for the price of its
precious metal. In the next breath, the cooperation
between the two countries is cited in the matter of plan-
ning an eventual steel mill to be erected at Concepcion,
Chile, Rnd development of electrical resources necessary
f . 1· . h Ior 1n(ustr1al progress 1n t at area. The admonition
other~ Considering the importance of copper to both the
on the one hand is hardly justified by the action on the
United States and Chile, it seems strange that if coopcr-
ation were to be satisfactory in either case, a settle-
other. Soon after this official statement, the Depart- Iment on such an issue would necessarily preclude all
ment reported briefly on its willingness to cooperate in
the findings of a joint mission of the U.No to Chile on
the development of that country's agricultural 2resources.
1. "Achievements of Inter-American Cooperation." Edw ard
G. Miller, Jr., OJashington, Dept. of State Bulletins,
1952). Vol. XXVII, 705.
20 "Recommendations for Agricultural Development Program
in Chile." (Washington,Dept. of State Bulletins,
1952)_ Vol. XXVII, 1025.
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Despite such expressions of good will and cooperation,
the Ibanez election of 1952, was considered to have re-
flected the unpopular position of the United States in
Ch il e.. Cecil Robinson, director of the Chilean-North
American Cultural Institutes at Concepcion, wrote for the
Yale Review (1953), that he had experienced a decided
wave of anti-Americanism in Chile, before his return
from a tour of duty for the Department of State. He
reported that the Department had been most wary of any
bold moves to combat this attitude because of its
persistent policy of non-intervention in domestic affairs
in Latin American countries.l
President Ibanez had been described in many publica-
tions as a former ex-dictator and friend of Peron of
Argentina. A quick review of the popular votes of that
1952 election may be of interest:
Ibanez ••••• 432,920
Matte ••••• _ 252,648
(for the Radical Party)
(for the conservative Liberal
Part y)
(incumbant-retiring President
Vide la's picked successor)
(votes ~redited to Communist
support)2
Allende •• $. 51,984
1. Cecil Robinson, "Conception, Chile: South American
Microcosm," Yale Review, Vol. XLII: 580-9, June, 19530
2. "Chile's New Broom: HoW Clean a Sweep?" Business
~, Sept. 13, 1952, 164-5.
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R. J. Alexander, an authority on Latin American politics,
has analyzed this election and credited Ibanez election
to five factors:
1. Fifteen years of inflation, annually getting
worse.
2. General discreditment of all of Chile's major
political parties, most of which had supported
retiring President Videla's unpopular policies.
3. The high handedness of the Videla gove~nment,
particularly in the ill-fated IIDefense of Demo-
cracy Act," which had outlawed ..the communist
party, but had been applied against opponents
of the government in other parties.
4& A new spirit of national self-interest.
5. The ineptitude of the united States in pushing
the unpopular Ue S.-Chilean Military Defense
Treaty of 1952, which Chilean voters viewed
as reflecting too little united States concern
with Chilean economic recovery and development,
too much concern with the Cold War.l
There is little wonder that there was considerable
concern in united States diplomatiC circles when a pro-
ject~d visit by Peron waS planned in Chile in early 1953.
Immediately after World War II, the Peron government had
made possible an important and impressive $175 million
2
loan to the Chilean government. Despite popular
sentiment against Peron in Chile, President Ibanez
1.. R. J. Alexander, "Strong Man Regime in Chile,"
Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. XXXII: 1-2, Jan. 15,
1953.2. Carleton Beals, LandS of the Dawning Morrow (Indiana-
polis, Babbs-Merrill, 1948) 164.
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expected improved relations with Argentina to directly
benefit his administration. But the invitation to Peron
proved very unpopular in Chile, and the mission proved
to be a failure from its inception. Fortunately for the
United States, President Ibanez moved steadily away from
Peron after 1953, and towards improved relations with
. Ithe Un1tcd States.
In the spring of 1954, Preston Hotchkiss, United
States representative to the Economic and Social Council,
U.N., answered charges of the Soviet Union's representa-
tive that the United States was abusing Latin America, by
citing private United States investments in Chile, as
an example of cooperation with economic development.
Using the Council's own "economic survey" as evidence,
Mr. Hotchkiss called attention to United States' private
investment in native Chilean industries producing glass
products, tires, synthetic textiles, all of which the
report established as entirely consummed by the Chileans
2themselves.
Later in 1954, Thurston B. Morton, assistant-secretary
for CongreSSional Relations, reported on the cooperation
achieved bebween the United States and Chile, in the mattcr
1. "No Ally for Peron," Business Ii/eck, Feb. 28, 1953, 145.
"In Search of Something: Argentina and Chile," Time,
Vol. LXI: 28, March 2, 19530 "Peron on Chilean Soil,"
Newsweek, Vol. XLI: 37, Mar. 9, 1953.
2. "Reply to Soviet Charges-·.U ..S. JJncouragement of Foreign
.Industry," (Washington, Dept. of State Bulletins, 1954)
Vol. XXX, .758_83.
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of copper sales to Soviet markets:
It is our responsibility to guard against the
rise of communism elsewhere in Latin America.
The principal danger points are those countries
which lack diversified industries. Chile's de-
pendence on copper and nitrates is well known.
To aid the slipping market after Korea, the
U. S. stockpiled one hundred thousand tons of
copper. Chile at the same time agreed not to
ship behind the Iron Curtain, although the Soviet
Union agreed to purchase surplus copper of her •
•••Agricultural production has suffered in Chile
due to the industrial boom there, and neglect.
We are sending through our Foreign Operations
Administration technicians and demonstrators to
Chile to assist in restoring its agriculture.1
We can find our best statement of United States'
objectives towards Chile, implied from a development
of the following points discussed by Henry F. Holland,
assistant secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,
in October, 1955:
OBJECTIVES ARE IN GENERAL PRINCIPLE:
1. To encourage the economic, industrial, commercial
development of the Republics:
(a) because, economic expansion creates trade
with U. S.
(b) because development means a strengthening of
the same spiritual and moral principles we
share together -- sanctity of the individual
and his freedom, his well being never
sacrificed to the benefit of the state.
2. Our policies should be so clearly stated as to
permit all to knoW them.
1. Thruston B. Morton, "Agriculture and U. S. Foreign
Policy __ Chile in International Trade," (Washington,
Dept. of State Bulletins, 1954), Vo1o XXI, 201.
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3. That our policies encourage all enlightened,
self_interest, as part of all the governments.
4. To adhere strictly to a policy of nonintervention
as a basis of the Inter-American system. '
OBJECTIVES Of OUR SPECIFIC FOREIGN POLICY:
1. Economically to assist in the build-up of stronger
economies and to raise the standard of living,
in keeping with their heritage of a religious
approach to life, its emphasis on manls personal
freedom and dignity.
( a)
( b)
( c)
(d)
By an increase of trade,
the use of our technical knowledge,
the encouragement of private investment ,
and to the intensified activities of the
Export-Import Bank for private business
development.
2. Politically, on the basiS of our inter-American
treaties and principles of non_intervention to.. 'seek peaceful solut10n to d1sputes and protection
of our principles through the organization of
American states.
3. Militarily, to encourage the concept of a joint
American homeland to whose defense each makes a
coordinated contribution in termS of capacities.
4. CulturallY, to broaden, strengthen mutual under-
standing and respect that are the strongest
ties between our peoplesel
These vieWS properly restate the opinions as to the
objectives the united states should have regarding Latin
America, as stated by Dr. Milton Eisenhower following his
1953 fact-finding mission to the area.
It is most sur-
prising therefore to turn noW to the Eisenhower report of
195
8
, by way of commentary on the successful realization
of these objectives during the period, 1953-19580
1. "Objectives of U. S. Foreign Policy in Latin America"
Henry F. Holland (Washington, Dept. of State Pub.
6131, 1955).
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The Eisenhower Report of 1958 on Latin America
Dr. Milton Eisenhower had recommended a nine-point
Latin American program to the President as a result of
his 1953 mission. Basically he had called for a stabilized
and consistent trade policy, with a stockpiling facility
for those imperishable materials we import that are
subject to wide market fluctuation in values. To encourage
private United States investment, tax-free incentives were
recomnended, with public loans were suggested for economic
development where private capital could not assist. He
further recommended an extension of technical assistance,
and the use of surplus food supplies, and a joint cooper-
ative approach for the fullest use of technical coopera-
tion programs with related groups in the United Nations
and the O.A.S.
The 1958 Eisenhower report presents a clear case of
indictment for the failure of our government to accomplish
the ends proposed in 1953. The 1958 report is couched in
a sense of disturbed alarm at the state of inter-American
relations, in comparison to what it had been in 1953.
Dro Eisenhower reported a state of gross misconceptions
about certain basic ideas during his 1958 trip. These
misconceptions he classified in three basic groups:
(a) that United States' lending potential is unlimited,
and that our country was discriminating against Latin
America in the use of our fundS; (b) that we fix prices
-17-
in this country, thereby seriously affecting the many
one-product economies of Latin America; (c) that the
United States tends to support dictators in Latin America,
rather than democratically selected governments.
To combat these misconceptions, Dr. Eisenhower
recommended that the United States government initiate
a n ew program to improve "understanding': of our policies
with Latin American countries. To accommodate this in
each individual country, a committee of one hundred
leading citizens of that country would join our govern-
mental effort to improve the proper exchange of informa-
tion. He further called for closer cooperation between
our own National Commission for Latin American Affairs,
the Department of State, and such agencies as the U.S.
Information Agency, in order to keep our own citizens
informed about Latin America.
By its own admission, the report points a finger at
the government's own facilities for failure to keep itself
posted on problems in the field, particularly in the
area of information. Dr. Eisenhower presents a very
lengthly series of proposals, somewhat repetitious of
1953, from which our government might regain the incentive
in Latin American affairs:
1. To provide technical development loans:
a. through a newly proposed Inter-American
Bank, with special assistance from our
International Cooperation Administration;
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b. by furthering cooperation between the
new Inter-American Bank, and the existing
International Bank and Export-Import Bank;
c. to permit technical cooperation to be directly
under the supervision of the U. S. Ambassador
in each country.
2. To improve information facility:
a. particularly to those interested in laws
and regulations on our marketing quotas,
and fullest exchange based on our contact
with world markets affecting single product
economies;
b. to participate in study groups with those
countries faced with single product economies.
3. Regarding nonintervention and recognition:
a. to reduce to a formal handshake recognitionour relations with so-called dictators;
b. to refrain from granting any special recog-nition to such dictators.l
The immediate result of the 1958 Eisenhower Report
was a neW vigor given the approach to the subject by
Congress.
Two reports of Congressional Committees have
been recently published which reflect a changed attitude
on Congressional levels.
In May, 1959, the subcommittee
on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives submitted a report
on the subject of Latin American relationso Th is report
1. Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, united States-Latin
American Relations, Report to the President (Wash-
ington, Dept. of state publ. 6764,1155, T9'59)0
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clearly outlines in precise language the strategic,
economic, and political importance of Latin America, to
the united States. The report largely endorses Dr.
Eisenhower's proposals. In an admission of error in
neglecting Latin American economic development, the
report made the following recommendations:
1. To modify our attitude towards Latin American
dictators.
2. To increase our reliance on the Organization of
American States.
3. To revise our military aid program by
(a) providing for an orderly and gradual re-
duction of military armament grants;
(b) but to retain the well-received military
training grants afforded to intere~ted
republics.
4. To encourage more nongovernmental, people-to-
people activities.
5. To expand a binational center program, in line
with the Eisenhower's 100 leading citizen
committees.
6. To sustain neWS coverage of Latin Americandevelopments by the neWS media.l
The second Congressional report is perhaps the
more important. Under Senate Resulution 31, 86th Congress,
February 2, 1959,
the authority of previous Resolution 330 ,
85th congress, July 28, 1958, was continued to allow
expenditures for the preparation of studies of United
1.
"Report on United states Relations with Latin America ..
ff' . 'Committee on Foreign A . a1rs, House, 36th Cong~,
1st Session (Washington, U.S. Govt. Printing Office,
1959) ..
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States-Latin American relations. Under the direction of
the subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, an eight-part study was
wtlined for investigation under private and independent
auspices to furnish the Committee on Foreign Relations
with proper and dependable information about this subject.
There is little doubt that these reports individually
and formed into a body of reports on the subject of
Latin American relations, comprise the most impressive
undertaking by a Congressional body in recent diplomatic
history. A vcry brief summary of these peports is
essential to furthering our knowledge of United States
objectives towards Latin America, and Chile in particular.
The first study, of post World War II political
developments in Latin America, was prepared by the
School of Inter-American Affaits of the University of
New Mexico.
This report graphically illustrated that the
one "overwhelming political development ••• since World
War II, has been the attainment of political power by
the people.11 Reflecting United States failure to proper-
ly appraise the impact of the new nationalism in the
republics, the eagerneSS for an extension of our own
world-wide anti_communist campaign has prevented our
leaders from properly appraising the essential im-
portance of Latin American leaders and their interest
in their own internal social and economic problems.
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The report makes a statement of significance:
If the two major antagonists in the cold war
both exploit the area for their advantage, Latin
America, feeling that it has no stake in the in-
ternational conflict, will assume a'neutral pos-
itiono To the communist will belong the future,
if they succeed in capturing control of popular
nationalist revolutions, either by default due
to insufficient u. S. vigilance with respect to
the subversive threat or as a reaction against
too close united States identification with the
traditional order.
The following recommendations from this study are summar-
ized as to their important points:
1. In the area of collectiv~ security, the U" S.
should promote disarmament in Latin America,
at the same time de_emphasizing the military
aspect of our own policy.
2. In the area of democracy and dictatorships,
the Uo S. should pay marc than lip service to
struggling civilian democracy in Latin America,
at the same time remaining neutral towards
existing dictatorships.
3. Because "the key Latin American determinant of
political cooperation in u. S. assistance is in
the resolution of economic problems, ., the
U. s. should develop long-range economic assis-
tance programs (not year-to-year), particularly
avoiding those regimes bent on preserving an
outworn order ..l
The second of the reports to the Senate was prepared
by the International Economic consultants, Inc., Wash-
ington, on the subject the commodity problems of Latin
America. This technical report restates the economic
facts of life for Latin America.
Dut it bravely calls
1. "Post World War II Political Developments in Latin
America," No.1 (Washington, U.S. Govt. Printing
office, 1(60) #125.
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for a liberalized Uo S. import policy, financial assis-
tance to develop diversification in the restricted
areas, and for international action on commodity prob-
lemse The report specifically criticizes the closed-
minded approach of the U. S. on the subject of market
regulation through commodity agreements, including the
adequacy of the administration's plans for future action
on commodity
1problems ..
Thethird of the reports to the Senate waS prepared
by Northwestern University, Department of Political
Science, on the subject of the Organization of American
States. It is a thorough reporting job on the structure,
importance, and future of the O.A.S., in termS of the
united States' foreign policy. In some frank and prac-
tical language, the study recommends the establishment
of an Inter-American auxiliary force (similar to the U. N )~ 1. ,
along with a special Inter-American military college; the
relocation of the O.AooS. headquarters in an inter-American
district; the establishment of an inter-American
university for special studies; and to begin steps
toward the miltilateralization of the Panama Canal
under the aegis of the O.A.S. Each is certainly a
constructive proposal aimed at the strengthening of
1. "Commodity Problems in Latin America," (Washington,
U.S. Govt. Printing office, 1960) #125.
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the 1O.A.S.
The fourth study deals with United States business
and labor in Latin America, and prepared by Research
Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change of the
University of Chicago. It is a welcome contribution to
the already impressive library of information on business
conditions in Latin America, but particularly on the
comple~ matter of labor conditions. Its long list of
serious recommendations is extremely important reading
for their reasoning, particularly in the value of exchange
programs between U. S. and Latin American labor.
2
policies affecting economic relations is the subject
of the fifth study prepared by the National Planning
Association, Washington8 This report recommended that
one of the first requirements for improved relations
was a change in the attitude or spirit with which these
policies have been administered. The N.P.A. expressed
the view that an organizational device similar to that
of the coorinator of Inter-American affairs employed
during World War II, would be an improvement in the
method for handling hemispheric affairs. The report
called for more long-range policy and program planning,
1. "The organization of American States," 113 (Washing-
ton, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1960).
2. "United States BusinesS and Labor in Latin America,"
#4 (Washington, U.S. Govt. Printing office, 1960).
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and the abandonment of broad-term views and goals in
preference to those aims wherein possibilities for
greater integration of the Western Hemisphere as a
. d 1attal.ne •whole cou1d be
The sixth study, prepared by the Institute of
International Studies and Overseas Administration of the
University of Oregon, deals with the problems of economic
development. This report deals with the topic most
neglected by U. S. interests" Because of certain past
failures of various projects attempted by Latin American
countries, a rigid device was recommended for future
programs based on international recommendation as to the
ability of recipient countries to perform. A thorough-
going recommendation for closer coordination among
lending institutions to utilize all available capital,
particularly through a neW Inter-American Development
2
Bank, waS particularly stressed.
The seventh study, dealing with Soviet Bloc activi-
ties, was prepared by the corporation for Economic and
Industrial Research, Washington.
A most enlightening
1. "United states and Latin American policies Affecting
Their EconomiC Relations,"#5 (Washington, U , S. Govt.
Printing Office, 1960).2. "Problems of Latin American Economic Development,"
06 (Washington, U. So Govt. Printing office, 1960).
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survey of the state of Communist penetration and programs
is followed by recommendations to overcome the Soviet
Blocs' basic drive to neutralize the area. A thorough-
going reorientation of the United States' political
approach was recommended to the Congress and the execu-
tive branch of the government in order to break with the
complacent tradition of our Latin American affairs. To
accomplish this end, the Department of State would be
required to establish a larger and more qualified corps
of specialists permanently attached to this field of
service. The method of handling Latin American affairs
by our government demands a thorough going-over, based
on a frank ~hange of philosophy regarding the importance
f . . . 1o the Latin Amer1can area to Un1ted States 1nterests.
The eighth study, dealing with the "Organization of
the U. S. Government for Dealing uith Latin American
Affairs," is being prepared by the Brookings Institution,
WashinGton, and is still to be published. This final
study could be one of the most important of this group
of studies. Its recommendation could mean the difference
in the success or failure in the utilization and imple-
mentation of the valuable information produced by the
other impressive studies.
1. "Soviet Bloc Latin American Ac t i.vi t des and Their
Implications for United States Foreign Policy,"
It? OJashington, Uo S. Govt. Printing Office, 1960).
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Since the beginning of the Congressional studies
reviewed above, the Congress has approved the recommenda-
tions of the National Advisory Council and President
Eisenhower for the establishment of the Inter-American
Development Bank. The United States had long remained
cool toward the idea of the bank as proposed by the Latin
Americans themselves, preferring to handle development
loans through the facilities of the International Bank
for Development and Reconstruction and the Export-Import
Bank. The endorsement of the new bank reflects a re-
versal of Unitcd States government policy, and acceptance
of the view that it was desirable to have a specialized
institution dealing with the needs of this area, support-
ed at the same time largely by their (Latin American)
resources, and permitting the Latin Americans themselves
the opportunity of establishing their own priority on
authorized loans.l
With its official opening in Washington, in March
1960, the Inter-American Development Bank had an
initial and modest subscription of $150 million from the
member republics to begin its new tasks. The 40 per cent
subscription by the United States was a disappointment to
1. "Spccial Report of the National Advisory Council on
the Proposed Inter-A.merican Development Bank,"
(Washington, May 11, 1959) 86th Congress 1st Session.
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some Latin American leaders, who had hoped for a more
substantial contribution as expressing a changed attitude
insofar as our Latin American policy is concerned. The
eventual capitalization of the Bank is planned at $1
billion, but somewhat modest besides the $18 billion
subscribed to the International Bank, $14 billion with
the International Monetary Fund, and $7 billion with the
Export-Import Bank -- considered the world's largest
development and stabilization institutions.
Hemispheric Defense Reviewed.
It would be an oversimplification to state that the
Eisenhower Report of 1958, and the accumUlative summaries
of Congressional reports, pointed up the failure of
our foreign policy as .regards Latin America. It is
proper and necessary to sort out among the maze of facts
and figures exactly where and why our foreign policy
lacked the force to crystallize positive results, or at
least favorable attitudes among our Latin American
friendS. The key is doubtless found in the mutual
attitude among the parties to hemispheric defense.
Thomas W. Palmer, Jr., presents a very thorough
appraisal of U. S. deficiencies in his Search for a
Latin American POlicy.1 What he describes as a very
1. Thomas Wo Palmer, Jr., Search for a Latin American
Policy (Gainesville, University of Florida Press,
1957).
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distorted vision of Latin America in the U. S., coupled
with what might be called an infexiority complex over
Yankee intervention in Latin American affairs and over-
zealousness for a secured hemispheric defense program,
has lead our government not to properly gauge the
importance of internal development among Latin American
leaders. By misdirection and misinformation, we have
permitted the view to develop thai the U. S. is dis in-
terested in any problem unrelated directly to the
problem of security.
Further substantiation to this interpretation was
expressed by C. K. Yearley, Jr., when he wrote of
"Latin American Complaints:"
In seeking explanations for sharpening criticism
of U. S. policies and attitudes from within the
region, the existence of this vast economic fron-
tier may be the key. Frontiers seek their cure-
aIls in capital; thus their fears of a financial
"starving time" react upon the sources of supply,
••• Recent anti-Americanism has been rooted largely
in the problems produced by this extraordinary
acceleration of activity and by the tumultous
changes that have followed in its wake. While
few assailed the virtues of ~he Marshall Plan
etc., many felt that charity should begin within
the hemisphere ••• and vigorously questioned what-
ever warped logic sanctioned the bestowal of more
lavish bounties upon our forner enemies •••• 1
That the issue of hemispheric security had to be
properly resolved between the republics was discussed by
1. C. K. Yearley, Jr., "Latin Am eri ca.n Complaints,"
Commonweal Vol. LXXXI, #20, Feb. 12, 1960, 540.
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Ezequiel Padilla in terms of pan-Americanism and sOlid-
arity, in a review of the problem he prepared for Foreign
Affairs in 1954. Padilla clearly demonstrated that Latin
Americans had abandoned the Peron idea of an exclusive
fraternity of Latin American peoples as lithe" an sw er to
Latin American development. In fact this rejection of
Peron was an expression of the aversion to dictator-
leadership of Latin American causes; and that such
leadership only tended to destroy the O.A.S. Instead
of capitalizing upon this trend in Latin America, Padilla
contended that U. S.' neglect of Latin American economic
development and our apparent encouragement of men like
Peron was in effect endangering the whole picture of
I
hemisphere defense.
A few comments on united States-Chilean relations
regarding hemisphere defense are most revealingo In a
1953 review of Chile's position in our defense arrange-
ment S q R 1\T B r .;ted eh';le as, the "Jc ey"" , ' , !'.r • • l~. U r c........ ,,-
to the
u. S. in any inter-American defense system. Chile's
vast copper resources make her a vital partner in such
matters. More specifically, Chile could provide the
essential leadership required in such affairs among most
1. Ezequiel Padilla, liThe Meaning of Pan_Americanism,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32-2, January 1954, 278.
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Latin American repub1ics.l Notwithstanding Mr. Burr's
reflections, the U. S. had previously (1952) blundered
in the negotiation with the out-going Vide1a government
in reaching agreement on military affairs during an
election punctuated with demands for economic reforms.
The consequent election of former dictator Ibanez
2
only further muddied the diplomatic waters.
Following the election of President Jorge A1essandri
in late 1958, Chile began to emphasize her role of 1eader-
ship among Latin American republics on the subject of
hemispheric defense. Realizing the economic drain of
military programs, President A1essandri called for an
end of armament competition among the republics. Almost
at once support for this view came from Argentine,
Brazilian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian sources.
3
Summary
united States' objectives towards Chile have been
stated in the most general of terms. The record seems to
substantiate the view that despite the rising criticism
of over-emphasis of military preparedness theme by the
1. Robert N. Burr, "Chile: Economic Nationalism,"
CURRENT HISTORY,·Vo1. XXIV, 165-69.
2. See pages 0-10 of this reporto
3. "Chile Ma y Set Pace for Latin Disarmament," U.P.
Report, Indianapolis ~, Nov. 29, 1959.
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United States, there was little or no reflection given
in United States policy to the request for specific
economic development assistance not related to our
overall military program. Considering the obvious
importance of Chile's copper resources to any hemis-
pheric defense system, the direction of United States'
policies has not reflected any intent to gain cooperation
of that republic in such a system by cooperation from
the U. S. in Chilean economic programs. The picture is,
of course, not just black and whiteo The following
chapters will review various areas where the U. S. has
actively cooperated in Chilean programs. The basic
point here is that, as the record indicates, our foreign
policy direction towards the Republic of Chile has not
reflected specific concern with economic development per
se, but is contributive evidence that no such programs
actually exist on a scale proportionate to the emphasis
required by that Republic.
It is apparent that our objectives towards a nation
such as Chile must be clarified if satisfactory relations
are to be expected in the long term. The military pre-
paredness race has taken on the flavor of a battle of
giants. A nation such as Chile, whose tradition has
been its best instructor on the futility of armament
build-Up, and whose future seemS cast in the modern mold
of economic development, represents an example in Latin
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America, elsewhere in the under-developed areas of the
world. But primarily, our direction and intention must
be resolved where our interests arc most affected,
Latin America. And our direction and intention should
first be resolved in an area where experience and trad-
ition predict substantial results for our own cause,
and in the Republic of Chile.
CHAPTER III
The Capacity for C~ilean Economic Development
The Republic of Chile represents one of the out-
standing examples of a one product economy in Latin
America. Chile's Twentieth Century economic history
would be written around nitrates and copper. The two
World Wars found Chile's mineral wealth of obvious im-
portance, particularly to the United States. Peculiarly,
the mineral wealth of the Republic represent the world's
largest known deposits of both, perhaps an unfortunate
blessing of nature. If we are to consider whether
economic development is a proper device for emphasis in
a United States' policy toward Chile, it would seem
reasonable to determine whether and to what extent Chile's
economic development is possible beyond her one product
potentiality.
With the advance in the utilization of aluminum as
an electrical conductor, we may wonder whether the story
of Chile's nitrate industry may repeat itself for Chile's
copper deposits. From the turn of the century to the
end of the first World War, the exploitation of nitrates
lead to a rapid extension of Chile's economic life. A
dramatic and tragic collapse of this native industry was
predicted when the Germans introduced synthetic nitrates
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during that war. The results to Chile's economic life is
a perfect example of the effects upon a one product economy
from forces beyond any foreign policy control.l The
tremendous struggle carried on in Chile to preserve this
vital industry continues even to this day. The valu able
experience gained from facing the effects of lost markets
in a one product economy has benefited the Republic in
understanding the importance of economic development.
From a position of world monopoly in nitrates in 1910,
and considering the annual increase in world demand for
nitrates, Chile1s share in the world market was only
6 per cent of the world's supply in 1950, and only 3 per
2cent by 1959.
In the face of this declining market for the world's
largest supply of natural nitrates, the Chilean government
has taken vigorous steps to bolster this industry. Under
the watchful and planning direction of the government
controlled COVENSA, Nitrate and Iodine Sales Corporation,
several economic measures have been implemented to create
new life in the Nitrate industry:
1. Through 1954 legislation, a more favorable invest_
ment climate has been created for the industry.
1. "Chile" (Washington, Pan American Union, 1957) 20.
"From 1850 to about 1930, the production of natural
nitrates was amajor industry; but the increasing
use of synthetics had reduced nitrate exports to
about half their former peak by the early 1930Is."
2. "Basic Data on the Economy of Chile" O'Jashington, Dept.
of Commerce, Feb. 1959) Part I, No. 59-15, 8.
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Known as the Nitrate Referendum, inducements in
the form of protected exchange rates, tax incentives,
custom duty exemptions, were allowed to induce
investment and provide greater "efficiency" in
production.
2. Foreign loans to allow expansion and development
were arranged by the government.
As a result of this action, the principal producers,
Anglo-Lautara Nitrate Company, an American company which
produce~ 60 per cent, and COSATAN, Compania Salitrera de
Tarapaca Y Antofagasta, which produces 24 per cent of the
total nitrates, have embarked on an expansion and modern-
ization program. Credits arranged by the Export-Import
Bank of Washington, have placed nearly $33 million with
1these two producers.
exported in 1957 reflected united States orders. As an
I
I
I
I
I,
i
I
I
:1
I
"
I
I,
I
Nitrates earn Chile nearly $60 million annually in
foreign exchange. 45 per cent of the 1.2 million tons
example of private U. S. investments, and financial
cooperation, the nitrate industry is a formidable argument
for foreign policy implementation in the area of economic
development. The Industry represents the best example of
Chilean determination to overcome obstacles in an area
where the more faint hearted would have abandoned hope.2
, ,
1. "Annual Report, 1959" Cumulative Statement of Loan
Operations by Areas, Feb. 1934-June 1959. (Washington,
Export-Import Bank) Chart lb, page 73.
2. "Chile" (Washington, Dept. of State, May 1959) 9. See
the Appendix, Tables 1-4, for itemization of exports-
imports.
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The nitrate industry of Chile is the parent of
Chile's important new chemical industry, which in turn is
producing a limited number of basic industrial chemicals:
sulphuric and hyrochloric acids, carbonates, ammonia,
glycerin, and sodium products • Explosives are manufactured
.by some of the larger plants. Finally, Chile is the worlds
. f . d' 11ead~ng producer 0 ~o ~neo
It has been one of Chile's chief aims to diversify her
sources of economic life. Tied hand in hand with her
major export items (copper and nitrates) are the problems
of inflation, industrial diversification, and favorable
world prices for her mineral resources. The basic economic
problem facing Chile has been a realistic development of
her natural resources in world markets and at the same
time relieving her over-dependence upon these resources.
Chilean Economic Development, 1929-41
The economic state of Chile has been one of the most
investigated and analyzed topics in current official
international publications dealing with Latin America since
VJorld War Two. International statistical gathering and
specialized studies have attempted to answer the question
why the Chilean economy has not revived productively since
1. "Chile" (Washington, Pan American Union, 1956) 23-24.
See "Industrial and Economic Progress in Chile" (Nell}'
York, Chilean Nitrate Educational Bureau, Inc. 1950)
on nitrate industry.
~~-...~.--.. ~~------------------
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the end of that war. The answer does not lie exclusively
in the problem of a one product economy.
Much of Chi1ets present economic straights originated
as a result of the depression of 1929. Despite the decline
of Chile's nitrate sales after the First World War, her
economy continued to expand and develop at an amazing rate
and waS recorded to be one of the best in the Western
Hemisphere prior to the depression. The economic well-
being of Chile during the 1920's was reflected in the
liberal construction taken in the formation of the Con-
stitution of 1925, and the election of Aurturo Alesaandri
as president that year. Both were the cUlmination of a
rising liberal reformation dating from the turn of the
century.
The world wide depression finally caught up with Chile
in 1931. Chile had the unenviable record of the world's
greatest percentage decrease in both export and import
1trade. Such an economic upheave1 and violent restriction
of trade seriously affected her political stabi1ity~ But
the records reflect that despite these difficulties, Chile
handled her economic depression in a swifter and more
concerted manner than did many of her world-neighbors.
1. P. T. ~llsworth, Chile, An Economy in Transition (New
York, MacMillan Company, 1945). See the Appendix,
tables 5-6, for reference to the depression.
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1. Legislation encouraged renewed building activity
from 1934 to 1941:
Chile's reaction to the depression was a rapid one.
Three specific factors account for her post depression re-
covery, and are interesting in comparison to similar measures
employed in the united States.
(a) Chilean Congressional laW 5314, December 1933,
relieved of taxes all buildings constructed
before 1935, and for a ten year period.
(b) Measured in 1000 square meters of surface area
covered, the annual rate of building recovered
from a graph reflected low of 108.7 in 1931,
to 190.1 for 1933; 371.8 for 1934; 259.0 for
1936; and to 483.9 for 1940.
20 Stimulation was given to industrial development by
a quick depreciation of Chilean currency (similar to
Japan), and a sharp increase of tariff barriers to
protect native industry:
(a) Newly raised capital allowed native Chilean
industry to expand from the annual low in
1933, of 14902 pesos, to 397 million pesos
in 1934, with each year reflecting an increase
through 1942 (save for a decline in 1936 as
the result of a brief recession)o
(b) General industrial praduction rose from 98
in 1935, to 123 by 1941, based on an average
of 100 for the period 1935-36.
(c) Pomento, the Corp. de Fomento de 1a Produccion,
was organized in 1940,to permit the government
to co-ordinate industrial and economic expansion
and development.
(d) New credit and lower interest rates, the use
of the corporate form of organization (not used
extensively in Chile prior to the depression),
tended to encourage industrial recovery.
3. The recovery of world markets was gradual, but im-
portant. However, this recovery in export gains
was the least important in Chile's post depression
recovery. In fact, Chile has still to regain the
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levels of her pre-depression . 1trade.
These separate factors were responsible for Chilean
unemployment dropping from a high of 129,000 in November
1932, to 8,000 in 1935.
The Chilean Congress acted promptly to halt the disaster
of deflation of its currency. Chile's immediate unfavorable
balance of trade dropped her gold reserves from 493 million
gold pesos in 1929, to 213 million in 1931; money supply fell
42 percent in 18 months. Law 4973, of July 30, 1931, created
a new exchange control law tending to restrict the gold flow.
Coupled with a depreciated currency and better interest
rates, the fluid money supply was "borrowed" by the govern-
ment itself in order to stimulate new confidence among
private borrowers. Such items as public works bills (Law 5028,
5105, in 1932) paved the way. Stabilization was achieved
in late 1933, when the government balanced its budget, and
reduced government expenditures from their earlier stimu-
lating peak"
The post depression period in Chile reflects several
important factors necessary in understanding the Chilean
economy after World War Two. The beginnings of a new social
individualism developed: a tendency for the people to rely
upon the government for direction of economic activity,
particularly in the investment of private Chilean wealth
1. Ibid., 29.
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in native enterpriseso The new prosperity of the period
whetted the appetites of a great number of the peoples for
improved standards of living. In a sense, this accounts for
the very noticeable lack of private savings that has con-
tributed to the inflationary cycles following the Second
World War.
The economic recovery in Chile accounted, in part, for
the lack of enthusiasm on the part of Chileans for part i-
cipation in the Second World War. A neutral position would
have suited Chilean opinion. But an after-the-fact analysis
of Chilean' cooperation in the allied war effort has es-
tablished the essential role of Chile's mineral wealth
toward the outcome of the war, particularly to U. S.
interests. It is not surprising therefore that Chile has been 11'I
1
1!:
1
/
I
a leading critic of U. S. post-war spending programs that
seemed to neglect causes set forth by Latin Americao
Stated in the most simple terms, the proper argument
of the Chilean government has been that since it was an
important member of the allied team in the Second World War,
its arguments for the proper consideration for bona fide
economic development loans deserved reasonable priority
cause connected with the Cold War, and with financial aid
with the U. S. governmento U. S. predisposition with any
in terms of Some related military preparedness program, al-
most precluded any possible understanding of arguments
along strictly economic lines. So, for over fifteen years,
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the gulf between these two positions has widened to the
point of the near collapse of the previously hard-won
state of understanding encompassed in the "Good Neighbor"
policy.
The Economic Capacity Picture, 1945-60
In order to substantiate the arguments that economic
development funds and loans would have been used properly
by Chile, if available, and would have consequently benefited
the U. S. position in Latin America, it is necessary to re-
view state of Chilean economic health since the war. He are
most fortunate that there are available very adequate re-
views on this subject.
Simon G. Hanson summarized the following important
features in the Chilean economy and society, for the decade
cn d i.ng in 1950:
1. There existed in Chile a very favorable and
competent managerial drive, substantial enough
to predict a possible continuing industrial
growth. The manufacturing industry of Chile
had exp an ded at a rate of 4 per cent annually
during the decade.
3. Chile's geographic location isolating her from
most world markets placed specific limitations
on industrial expansion.
2. An ample labor supply that was both intelligent
and industrious produced a benefit not similar
in most other Latin American republics. Two
factors depreciated this benefit: labor efficiency
Was low due to malnutrition and disease; only
5 per cent of the national income was being saved.
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4. Due to economic planning, Chile was becoming
the largest producer of coal in Latin Americao
Development of neW petroleum fields would
begin to accomodate new industry.
5. With over 40 million acres of forest lands
(93 percent in hardwoods), this natural value
could be most beneficial to Chile's development
if some method were utilized to prevent an
annual loss of nearly 682 million cubic feet
of timber to fires.
6. Chile has a substantial medium business climate.
One-fifth of the national income is produced from
the manufacturing (largely one and two-man shops)
area, emploring 17 per cent of the available
work force.
On Octob2r 6, 1949, the Chilean government requested
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to
send a mission to Chile to study her economic problems. An
economic mission of the Technical Assistance Administration
of the U. N., made its study during the Chilean Summer of
1949-50. Its recommendations and findings make an approp-
riate beginning of the period 1950-60, a period one might
entitle Chile's time of troubles. Embodied within this single
report can be found similar statements and restatements by
other later missions, study groups, investigatory bOdies,
working on plans and programs for the Chilean government.
The overall objectives of these groups is always the same:
to correct the course of Chile's economic development by
creating an atmosphere of stability permitting growth.
10 Simon G. Hanson, Economic Development in Latin America,
(Washington, Inter::American Affairs Press, 1951) 166-168.
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. . .The U. N. economic m1SS10n s report presented the
following findings:
Part I. The "Short-Run" Problems.
1. Inflation, the most important onc, requires
a forceful deterrent policy:
i. to stop the attitude of expectation
of price increases among consumers
and producers;
iio to establish an equilibrium between
monetary DEMAND, and the available
SUPPLY of commodities and services,
by restraining money supply and in-
creasing the supply of goods.
2. The state of SAVINGS in Chile reflected
a lack of national thrift. To overcome
this, a national lob1igatory.savings"
program should be. initiated. An interest
bearing program would permit future re-
demption:
i. from labourers outside agriculture,
based on retaining 5 per cent from wages;
ii. from employees in other categories,
5 per cent;
iii. from others: a special 5 per cent
from the first 200 thousand pesos;
10 per cent on the balance over
and above this amount.
3. A much too lax credit policy must be
brought under control and stiffened.
Part II. The"Long-Run" Problems.
1. The need for administrative reforms
within the government itself.
2. The requirement for a balanced national
budget.
3. A clarification of the government's
financial policy would set the pace
of reform required of individuals.
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4. Each individual state in the Republic
should initiate similar budgetary reforms.
5. A thorough tax reform should be studied.l
The report of this mission was published late in 1951.
It presented the retiring Videlia government with an in-
appropriate campaign tool for the 1952 general elections.
There is no doubt that the report's impact was lost in the
confusion of Chilean politics. Perhaps the report was
repudiated indirectly along with the government's candidate ,
as a result of surprising election of President Ibanez.
Obligatory savings and credit restrictions in a full-
blown austerity program are hardly campaign sloganso But
that inflation was the real enemy to Chile's desire for
economic development is best described in the following
account of its effects in that country:
Inflation is the villain Chileans blame for
their troubles -- inflation which has struck
hardest the poorest groups of the community •••
Since 1945 the official cost of living index
has risen 2,200 per cent -- a rise Chileans
claim grossly understates the actuality.
Workers' wages have lagged normally behind
prices, tending to depress the workers' al-
ready low living standards ••• Behind the
inflation is the fact that Chile has what
lookS to a foreignerlike an Alice in Wonder-
land economy. An extensive and expensive
social security systemimposes heavy drains
on the Government's budget, which is often
met by running heavy deficits, equivalent
simply to printing as much money as the state
needS. Over the past decade or so, money
1. "Report of the U.N. Economic Mission to Chile, 1949-
1950 (New York, U.No Tech. Assist. Admin., 1951).
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in circulation has jumped thirty-fold but
industrial production has risen only 50 per
cent. Thus a monetary avalanche has swamped
the only moderately increased supply of
goods, producing one of history's classic
inflations •••
Chile's internal economy is dominated by
monopolies operating on the assumption that
a profit of 30 per cent or more is normal.
Government regulations, with many possibilities
of favoritism, strangle free enterprise.
Perhaps the most vital fact from the social
and pplitical points of view is the extreme
inequality.... But statistically the lowest
40 per cent of Chilean families get only B
per cent of the national income, less than
half the share of the lowest 40 per cent
of Americans.l
This crisp and frank opinion substantially supports what
was expected for Chile, if reformist action were not taken
in the early 1950's along with the lines of the U.N. report.
The secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin
America of the United Nations, publishes an annual report
and review of Latin American economic affairs. These
reports during the period 1951-58, provide the best
authoritive statistical survey on Chile's economic con-
..,ditions.6 A summary of these reports present a somber
view of Chile's economic life during this period, and con-
sequent1y should be noted.
1. "Chile Riots Break Long Tension" Harry Schwartz. The
New York Times, April 7, 1957, IV-6o
2. As of late 1953, the Economic Committee for Latin America
of the U.N., is now permanently situated in Santiago.
Department of State Bulletin. XXXIX:982, Dec. 15, 1958.
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Period 1951-1952.
1. Chile's "slow" economic growth is reported.
For the period 1945-1952, Chile's gross national
product increased 2.8 per cent annually, as
compared with 6.5 per cent for Latin America
as a whole. A lower than average demographic
growth of 1.7 per cent annually had in turn
increased by 1.7 per cent the average per capita
gross product; but this was still only about
half that of Latin America as a whole.
2. The following reasons were given for the slow
rate of growth:
(a) a low rate of investment by Chileans;
(b) failure to II regain" Chile's 1925-29
levels of advantageous trade;
(c) any advantages of beneficial trade
during the period were devoted towards
improving the standards of living, I
not to improve domestic investments.
Period 1953.
1. The government's forced economy in expenditures
reflected the conclusion of the Korean War's
copper boom. Investments were consequently
down 23 per cent, reflected particularly in
a tighter credit policy by the Central Bank.
Import curtailment reflected the copper 2change.
1. Economic Survey of Latin America, 1951-52 (New York,
U. N. Dept. of Economic Affairs, 1953).
2. Economic Survey of Latin America, 1953.
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Period 19540
1. Chile's economic growth continues to slow down.
Trade drops to 50 per cent of its 1925-29 level,
due largely to the undermining of exportable
products from declining world prices.
2. Imports, on the other hand, were allowed to in-
crease without a proper utilization of native
Chilean industrial production, consequently
internal investment continued Chile on the road
of the lower rate of investment in Latin America.
3. An exceedingly sloW agricultural development
has required Chile to import requirements of
consumers, which might otherwise have saved
scarce export surpluses.
4. The U~ N. Commission recommended strong controls.l
Period 1955.
1. A 17.7 per cent increase of export values reflected
an improved copper market. Previous government
restrictions on imports produced a favorable
balance of trade. With 66 per cent of Chile's
total exports in copper, the overdependence on one
source of revenue for economic stability pre-
dicted future difficulties.2
1. Economic Survey of Latin America, 1954.
2. Economic Survey of Latin America, 1955.
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Period 1956.
1. Improved copper prices continue to improve
Chile's trade picture. But gross product
decreased 2.5 per cent from the 1955 level,
to a new four-year low. During the 1953-56,
period, Chile had reflected a 2.7 per cent
gross product increase, as opposed to 6.3
per cent for Latin American as a whole.
2. A IIfirst" real effort to check inflation
by the government was accomplished through
controls on credit and wages, and an attempt
to stabilize prices. Some slow down inthe
vicious rise of cost of living reflected these
policy changes.
3. The Commission reported that economic growth
was hampered largely from external prices of
1commodities exported by Chile to world markets.
An independent review of Chile's economy during 1956
illuminates the U. N. report:
In 1956 Chile took steps to halt spiraling inflation
•••and introduced measures to restore financial-
monetary stability. That year the cost of living
rose only 38 per cent, compared with 84 per cent in
1955.
1. Economic Survey of Latin America, 1956.
The Panama Declaration was signed July 22, 1956, by U.S.
and 18 republics, subscribing to the "destiny of America"
and to inter-American cooperation and support of the O.A.S.
(but no economic development or aid). See World Almanac,
1956.
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•••~nthusiasm for the anti-inflation program
waned as the economic situation weakened.
Industrial production ran behind the previous
year, and retail sales lagged. (During the
first three quarters) •••the sharp drop in
copper prices lowered e~port receipts and in-
tensified the government budget difficulties.
Prices rose 37 per cent (for consumers) ••••
(But) the cost of living dropped sharply in
fourth quarter partly because of increased
exports. And the price increases (for con-
sumers) for the year was held to only 13 1
per cent, the smallest increase since 1948-49.
The economic stability action taken by the Chilean
government in 1956 reflects directly on the influence
e~erted by the firm of Klein and Saks, a private u. S.
firm of economic consultants, engaged by the government
'1of Chile.~ The contribution of this firm will be
considered elsewhere in this report in the discussion of
the technical assistance devices employed by Chile during
the period, 1950-60.
Period 1957.
1. A more extensive report on Chile covers the
period from 1945-1957. One important conclusion
states that if the rate of growth of per capita
income is to be promoted along with internal
stability, at the same time producing a minimum
of pressure on the balance of payments, strict
production wou Ld have to be "altered" ..
1. "Economic Conditions in Chile" (New York, Chase-
Manhattan Bank of New York, 1957) prepared for the
Alexander Hamilton Institute of New York.
2. "Chile" (Washington, Depto of State, 1959) 10.
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2. Praise is given the governmnnt's inflationary
controls. Benefits were produced from a 60 per
cent increase in gross product over 1956.
3. The U. N. Commission reported the following
obstacles to economic stability in Chile:
(a) to high propensity to consumption by
the sector of population must able to save;
(b) investment is presently too specially
channeled, with too low rates of capital
formation;
(c) the instability, inelasticity of exports;
(d) agriculture and native industries fail to
meet consumption requirements, requiring
increased imports;
(e) public expenditures are "too flexible"
in the face of the fluctuation in internal
income;
(f) the regressiveness of the tax system in
relation to income increments, along with
too much dependence on duties accruing
from foreign trade.
4. The following government economic policy was cited:
(a) more diversification of export trade;
(b) increased agricultural production;
(c) development of native industry to absorb
population increment and the surplus
working population coming from rural areas;
(d) savings of foreign exchange from controls
on public expenditures, a~d from duties
on luxury itemS imported.
1. Economic Survey of Latin America, 1957.
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Two U. S. reports reflect on conditions in Chile during
1957. The assistant-secretary for Inter-American Affairs
explained the effect on Chile from declining copper prices
to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 3, 1958.
Considering the dependence of Chile on copper exports, that
government had faced a declining copper market for two years.
The London Metal Exchange price on copper had been roughly
56~ per pound, until the market broke in April, 1956. Since
that time, Chile's copper supply had shown almost a 50 per
cent decline in prices. Such international repercussions
were bound to damage Chile's stabilization efforts, although
these very efforts had in one sense lessened the blow to the
economy. U. S. cooperation with Chile in its stabilization
1efforts was reported to the Senate body_
The other report prepared by the Department of Commerce
was intended for the education of firms and their personnel
engaged, or intending to engage in business operations in
Chil e. The report illustrates the cost of living conditions
in Chile.
1. The cost of living changes rapidly due to price
changes on almost all goods and services.
(a) Hotel accomodation costs are similar to U.S.,
$6-$3 per day, without meals.
1. Roy R. Rubottom, .lr, , "U. S. Relat ions with Latin
America," Department of State Bulletin. XXXVIII: 521 ..
March 31, 1"9"588.
( b)
( c)
(d)
(e)
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Suitable and difficult to locate, un-
furnished houses and apartments cost
$175 per month.
Locally manufactured appliances are higher
priced, lower quality, than U.S. goods.
Utility oil is expensive, electricity is
undependable (due to rationing), with
bottled gas the best all-round service.
Personal service (cooks, maids) is reasonable
-- a cook for' $25-$40 per month, maid $18-$25
but lodging, uniforms, meals and transport-
ation is included.
2. Food and clothing costs reach U. S. levels.
Ca) Milk supply is iriadequate, of poor quality;
but meat and foodstuffs are good. Canned
foods are expensive.
(b) Locally manufactured clothing is more
expensive, lower quality than U. S. goods.
Cost of laundering a shirt, 50¢; drycleaning
a suit, $1.00.
C c)
Period 1953.
1958 was a presidential election year, and there seems
Gasoline costs 122¢ per gallon.
to have been a consequent relaxation of regulations on the
economy,. the prediction of political pressures. A general
pattern presented in past reports seem to have repeated
themselves in 1958: industrial production was depressed,
but yielded to an upward trend following the fall election;
1. "Living Conditions in Chile" Department of Commerce,
World Trade Information Service, Operations Reports.
HashingtoDo Part 2. No. 53-53. 3-5.
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agriculture produced an increase over 1957, due largely to
a good season; unrestricted credit increased currency by
31 per cent producing a consequent 32 per cent increase in
the cost of living index. The Chilean pesos was further
depreciated, and the foreign exchange reserve dropped due to
government spending to the tune of a $68 million deficit.
A real serious balance of payment problem Was averted only
through a $40 million assistance loan.
In terms of Chilean production, copper prices increased
to 27¢ per pound by the fall of the year from a January low
of 25¢. Nitrate prices remained steady, but production dropped
slightly. Iron, Chile's newest mineral manufacturing
development, nearly doubled its output to 1.7 million metric
tons. The newly elected government announced that 110
new-investment companies had been authorized by the govern-
ment, representing $61.6 million in values from the United
States, Panama, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Federal
1Republic of Germany.
Period 1959.
The year 1959 represented the first full year of the
administration of President Alessandri. Charles Griffin,
reporting in the "Summary of the Americas Economy," for
1. ".i:lconomic Developments in Chile, 195811 Dept. of Commerce,
World Trade Information Service, Economic Reports.
Part 1, No. 59-43.
_f
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the New York Times, cited in rather glowing terms Chile's
new optimism in reaching economic stability under Alessandri's
leadership. Under a coalition of rightist and centrist
political groups in the Chilean Congress, the President
was given extensive powers to bring the economy under further
control. In his first years report of accomplishments,
President Alessandri claimed:
10 a balanced budget, with no due obligations
unpaid;
2. a stabilized currency, and no new issues;
3. an increase in the hOldings of foreign ex-
change;
4. an increase of foreign investments in Chile;
5. initiation of a neW ten year expansionist
program for agriculture, mining, manufacturing,
and commerce.
The Griffin report reflected Chile's determination to gain
diversification of her industrial capacity in order to
overcome the dependence upon copper-nitrate exports. The
ten year program for expansion was placed in the hands of
FOMENTO, Chile's economic development corporation. This
body was charged with placing more than $350 million in
loans gained in 1959, for development purposes. Foreign
credits with nations like the Federal Republic of Germany
indicated improved trade relations on the part of both
parties. In the inter-American area, improved relations
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1with Argentina indicated an increased exchange of goods.
While the Griffin report may be prematurely optimistic
in the face of Chile's decade of troubles, other indications
seem to favor the possibility of improvement in Chile's
economic development under President Alcssandri's leader-
Ship.2 In January 1959, the government established its
neW monetary unit, the escudo, for the purpose of equating
for commercial purposes a unit closer to the value of the
U. S. dollar; one escudo or 1000 pesos, equals one dollar.
Working with the International Monetary Fund, the government
obtained a working, stand-by fund of $8.1 million in drawing
rights to prevent fluctuations in the ex ch an ge , The govern-
ment renewed a separate exchange agreement with U. S.
Treasury, and received an increase from $10 to $15 million
in its revolving credit fund.
In a further step to improve its trade balance by
product diversification, the government obtained from the
Export-Import Bank new credits of $25 million for further
1. Charles Griffin, "Chile Finds Path to !'JewStability"
New York Times, Jan. 13, 1960, Section: Summary of
the Americas Economy. 49.
2. See New York Times:
May 19, 1959: 45-5. "U.S. & Private Credits of $135 Million
to Bolster Development and Stability,,"
Jul 17, 1959: 32-3. "11 U.S. Banks with First N2.tional City
Bank of N.Y. Lend ~~55 Million to Chile."
Ju1 24~ 1959: 5-3. "Ve rgares Announces ~~300 Million Credits."
Aug 2, 1959: 3-1. I~Alessandri Inflation Fight Centers
.Around Increase of Food Supply."
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development of economic factors in Chile (discussed in
detail in another part of this report). Another loan for
Chilean expansion in the amount of $55 million was arranged
by eleven U. S& banks in late July, 1959.
Under a neW Chilean law, Economic Law, April, 1959,
the Chilean congress implemented a program to encourage
productivity by stimulating domestic and foreign enterprise,
. . 1l-nterventl-on. Thewith a minimum of government direct
Chilean stabilization program and the extensive authority
granted the President under the Economic Law, permit
extensive revision of the country's import regulations.
The aim here is primarily to improve foreign investment
potentialities, to provide a protective climate for newly
created industries producing for Chilean markets. Presidential
powers were extended into the tax field to allow a reform of
tax laws along with much needed fiscal economy in government
2
operations.
By late 1959, copper prices improved and contributed to
an improved Chilean fiscal condition. Production of copper
increased 33 pcr cent through July of that year. With iron
ore exports up 25 per cent during the first quarter, there
were definite indications that it might well pcp1ace sagging
1.. "Chile" (VJashington, Department of State, 1959), lO-llto>
3. IIChi1ean .Economy strengthens, Record Copper Year Ex-
pected .." Foreign Commerce Weekly, Vol .. 62-20. Nov .. 16,
1959. 5.....6.
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nitrate sales (down 9 per cent in the same period) as the
country's second largest export. But the inflationary
cycle remained Chile's chief economic problem: (luring the
first six months of 1959, the money supply expanded at an
annual rate of 36 per cent, and prices increased 48 per
cent. A state of relative prosperity was reflected in retail
sales at new "hi£;hs". The cost of living averaged at an
increase of 33.5 per cent for the year, despite a relatively
contained last six months period of adjustment of prices,
with some price "decreases" reflected in the months of
N 1ovember-December.
The improved foreign investment complexion was sub-
stantiated by increased competition for the available
Chilean imports of essential heavy and capital goods
(42 per cent of the total). The Unit~d Kingdom shipped
cars and truckS, textile machinery, fibers, elastics, dyes
and machine tools for this market. The Federal Republic of
Germany shipped cars and trucks, industrial machinery, steel
mill products, chemical dyes, plastics, tools and motorS.
Japan shipped electronic components, hand tools, motors, and
sewing machines. The united States exports to Chilee
represented 51.4 per cent of the total to the Republic.
1. "Chilean Economic Review." Foreign Commerce Heek1y.
March 1960.
Summary
The Chilean economy represents one of the best examples
of a one-product economy in Latin America. Well appraised
of this fact, the government of Chile has made a concerted
effort for economic diversification.
The program for improved levels of native industrial
production has been two-fold: first, to create such pro-
duction so as to reduce the dependence on imports of re-
quired consumer goods which misdirects exchange surpluses;
second, to develop neW facilities of production in other
areas than copper and nitrates, successfully reflected in
Chile's neW iron and steel capabilities.
Perhaps the greatest single problem facing Chile has
been inflation. In this area, Chile's economic history
since World War Two has made her a classic example of
this economic disease, a record similar to the classic
extreme of the plunge of her trade markets during the
depression of the 1930s. Despite a long series of well
prepared and documented reports to the Chilean government
explaining techniques to control inflation, the flavor
of self-discipline remained tasteless until latc in the
1950s. With one of Latin America~s largest and most
substantial middle classes, the desire for improved stand-
ards of living has drained expendable income, depressed
personal savings to astounding lows. Along with an
advanced and costly social security system, the govern-
ment has continued to exhaust its normal financial re-
serves while making investments in industrial and public
works aimed at encouraging diversification. Deficit
spending has in turn inflated the currency.
The high hopes of an inspired Alessandri administration
in its reformist moves has indicat~d a shift toward decisive
economic controls in hopes for stabilization. Through
the advantages of increased foreign investments, new capital
permits the direction of diversification without direct
governmental intervention. The savings here, along with
improved governmental operations, should lead to the balance
of budgets, and the increase of foreign exchange balances.
The capacity for Chilean economic development from
the status of a one-product economy appears to be good.
Diversification is apparently possible in an economy Where
new production is immediately required of a substantial
middle class dependent upon imports to meet their require-
men t s , This permits a wide range of new investment capa-
bilities from foreign sources. In the area of exportable
products, diversification in iron ore and steel manufacturincr 0'
along with substantial improvement in chemical derivitive
manufacturing, are steps predicting more economic stability
than less.
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In the following chapters, two specific arcas will
provide evidence of the "capacity" for Chilean economic
development. The first area will discuss the state of
U.S. private investments in the Republic, and the conditions
in which they exist. If U.S. foreighn policy is to reflect
an expanded phase in the under-developed areas of the world,
it will be done by encouraging private U.S. investment in
areas like Chile, and by U.S.-to-Chile capital investment
loans sufficient to permit large scale expansion of areas
in the Chilean economy required to support industrial
diversification.
The second area will discusS in detail the various
activities of the Chilean government to develop her capacity
for economic developmertt. If the record indicated that
Chile has utilized the best possible information and
techniques to develop her economy, an argument for support
of her efforts seems justifiable. Considering the obvious
importance of Chile's economic well-being to the U.S. and
its interests, the self_development phase of U.S. foreign
policy would therefore be advisable.
CHAPTER IV
united States' Private Investment
in the Republic of Chile.
New capital brought into the country by
foreign juridical persons or citizens of
foreign countries for the purpose of in-
itiating, enlarging or fomenting activities
which tend to stimulate the industrial
development or to improve the exploitation
of mineral, agricultural or forest resources,
and to improve or increase the means of
transportation, will be governed by this
Decree Law and will enjoy the privileges
herein established.l
The United States has been rebuked and castigated for
neglecting Latin America. As with many complex subjects,
the statement its~lf is as oversimplified as are the re-
p1i es .. In the area of foreign policy, there is a case
for arguments that in its economic aspects, the U. S.
has neglected Latin America .. But this argument would
apply in almost every area of the world save Western
Europe. And even in the latter, economic development loans
and financial assistance have been directly related to
military preparedness. Since Latin America has tended to
reject aid in terms of military values, an impasse has
developed over the use of means in arriving at an agreed
end.
1. Decree-with-force-of-law No. 437 of February 2, 1954,
and the am end D1en ts 0 f Law No. 12, 0 34, Art ic1e 1.
Republic of Chile.. Provided by Embassy of Chile,
Washington, DoC.
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It would be well to examine the record of U. S. economic
aid to foreign areas such as Western Europe, Eastern Europe,
Asia and the Pacific, the Near East, and Africa, and the
American Republics. During the six fiscal years, 1953-
58, such aid has averaged $1.8 billions annually. Of this
total, the American Republics obtained about $180 millions
annually. By definition, economic aid is divided into
grants or outright gifts, and credits or loans. During
this same period, of the total economic aid, an annual
average of $1.4 billions was in the form of grants, with ,I
$272 millions in credits. About $173 millions were returned
on principle of loans on an annual basis to offset these
credits. Based on this breakdown of grants and credits,
the American Republics received during this period an
average $64 million annually in grants, $114 million in
credits. During the year of 1956, this area repaid $43
million more than it borrowedo
With the lone exception of Eastern Burope, the American
Republics have run a poor last in areas obtaining economic
foreign foreign assistance, as described above. If Western
Europe's share is disallowed in the diSCUSSion, because of
its military importance, we still find that the Near East
and Africa enjoyed $303 million annually, or onc-sixth of
the total, Asia and the Pacific Area received $714 million,
or 40 per cent. And, in all other areas than the Americas,
the funds were almost entirely in grants. On the contrary,
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the American Republics area received only half as much in
f f " Ithe orm 0 grants as 1n cred1ts.
The very sad report on the use of U. S. dollar aid
throughout the post-war world has yet to be written. There
is no doubt a relationship between our aid-via-military
arrangements and the universal dissatisfaction and criticism
in almost every area where the U. S. has given away its
dollars. Considering the testimonials prepared on the
subject of the importance of Latin America to U. S.
interests, it seems the h~ight of folly that the direction
of U. S. funds has not evaluated the Americas area in a
more substantial manner. Further, in view of the consistent
request for credits, not grants, the failure to utilize
the cooperative determination of our Latin American friends
who wish to build on loans, is a further inditement of
U. S. foreign policy and its implementation through foreign
aid.
Insofar as united States foreign policy is concerned,
it has been left to private U. S. investments to perform
the job of economic development in Latin America. In this
particular area, U. S. cooperation in Latin America has
been excellent. But one could hardly compare the contri-
bution from private sources in the same category with the
1. See Appendix, Table 7.
-63-
government-to-government assistance that is required to
accomplish the climate necessary for encouraging these same
private investments. A team of the two forces would be
inevitable in their impression. Since 31 per cent of the
total Uo S. private investments are in Latin America, it is
all the more astounding that there exists such a dis-
proportionate representation between Latin America, and
the other areas of the world insofar as UoS. economic aid
is concerned.
Whether real, or substantively reflecting the pressure
of world tension over Soviet determinism, U. S. foreign
policy implementation with dollar aid has in its view of
what should come first, failed in its costly military
appr.oach to consider the vastly more important concept of
economic development. With so many dollars expended in
military values which today become obsolete on a day to
day basiS, and so few dollars realistically invested in
building up economically potential allies, the records be-
gins to be formed establishing the truth of the message of
Soviet determinism to destroy the U. S. by economically
ruining this country.
Chile Compared with Other Latin
Aiilerican Investments from Abroad
The report to the Senate of the united States, pre-
viously cited,well illustrates the Latin American view
on the problem of investments in thatarea:
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Latin American governments have complained that
U~S. insistance upon sound monetary and fiscal
policies is not politically feasible. They are
not convinced that private capital can handle
the job of basic economic development and demand
more public funds for this purpose. Because of
fundamental differences in economic policy, they
have over the past decade been unable to get the
U.S. to join in an inter-American economic treaty
designed to ease their credit and commodity pro-
blems. In their search for a solution to their
economic problems, many of which are problems
of their own making, the Latin American govern-
ments have been generally frustrated by what
they feel to be the 'business and banking men-
tality' that dominated U.S. econ£mic thinking
and policy toward Latin America.
Chile is further illustration of this statement. The
problem of investment here has not been a complaint of
instability in permanent government or its society.
Rather, Chile is the example of a hard-pressed economy
attempting to withstand volotile international markets
md create its own economic diversification. Despite
Chile's inflationary tendencies, the economic capacity of
the country along with the resourcefulness of the people
in applying technical cooperation, establish the strong
possibility that the Republic should be one of the best
investment areas available to private U. S. investments.
In 1954, Professor Rippy reviewed the course of
investments in Latin America, by Great Britain, as of
1. "Post World War II Political Developments in
Latin America." (1l1ashington, U. S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations~ 1959) Study I, 46.
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1928. Of bl billion at work in the area as a whole,
b76.9 million of British capital was at work in Chile,
returning 4.9 per cent yield annually. Examples of this
investment were Chile Telephone (b900,OOO), Chilca
Electric Tranway and Light Co. Ltd. (bl75,OOO), and
Whitehall Electric Investment Ltd. (blO.9 million). At
the peak of British investments, about 1913, only Argen-
tina (b420 million), Brazil (b285 oi11ion), and Mexico
(b199 million) surpassed Chile in British investment
favor.1
III
By comparison, Professor Rippy illustrates the values
1. By 1897, U.S. investments stood at $320 million,
60 per cent of which was in Mexico. About $2
million was invested in Chile.
of U.S. interests in Latin America, in support of his
argument for Latin America's place in the postwar foreign
relations of the U.S.
2. By 1914, the total had grown to $1.6 billion.
Chile's share of $180.5 miLlion placed her
third in favor of investment after Mexico
and Cuba.
II
II
'111
By 1930, the postwar boom had increased
total investments to $5.2 billion. Chilean
investments had reached $700.9 million;
Cuba realized $1 billion, ~rgentina $807
million, and Mexico $709 million, alone
surpassing her.
1. J. Fred Rippy, "British Investments in Latin America
at Their Pealco". Hispanic American Historical Review.
February 1954 •. XXXIV: 96£f. Also May, 1954, XXXIV:
251-55.
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4. By 1943, with the depression reflected in
investment values, total investmeets were
$3.4 billion, with Chile at $388 million.
Cuba's $590 million, Argentina's $497
million, Mexico's $422 million, and
Venezuela's $398 million, alone surpassed
Chile's favorable position.l
By the end of 1956, U.S. direct private investments
abroad totaled $22 billion, of which $7 billion was in-
vested in Latin America (double the amount invested in
Latin America in ten years). These Latin American
investments in 1955, produced $2.8 billion in goods
and services within Latin America, allowed $2.1 billion
in exports to the U.S. alone, representing 30 per cent
of our total exports from foreign countries. The surplus
of exports over imports of $900 million in values produc-
ed in return a $3.7 billion gain in foreign exchanges
within the area.
During this same year, 1955, U. S. investments pro-
vided $4 billion in wages, salaries, taxes, local pur-
chases, services and equipment, for the areas, while em-
p10ying 625,000 persons, of whom only 9,000 were U. S.
citizens,. An additional $ 600 million was invested for
expansion 2and development.
During the period since 1946 t U. S. private invest-
ments have not increased in Chile 1.nproportion to other
1. J. Fred Rippy, Globe and Hemisphere (Chicago, Henry
Regnery Co., 1958) 32, table 1, 36, table 3, 39,
table 5, and 43, table 7.
2. "U.S. Investments in the Latin American Economy."
(Washington, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1957).
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U. S. investments in other of the republics. These values
are up 40 per cent in Chile, from $500 to $700 million,
while Mexican investments are up 100 per cent from $350
to $650 million, Argentine investments up 150 per cent to
$500 million. The U.S. investments in Brazil, up from
$300 million in 1946, ,to $1.2 billion, are surpassed only
by investments in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela.
In the race for its share of U.S. private investment
dollars, Chile has not kept pace with her Latin American
1neighbors.
Several factors may have contributed to Chile's dic-
couraging record. Taxation on foreign private investments
may have contributed to this condition. In 1955, 65 per
cent of local payments made by U. S. mining companies
operating in Chile were for taxes. That same year 15 per
cent of local payments of U. S. manufacturing companies
operating in Chile went for taxes. In this latter case,
local payments for taxes in Argentina by manufacturing con-
cerns was only 13 per cent, which may have reflected why
the book value of such facilities was $230 million in
Argentina, and only $37 million in Chile. Similar comparison
in Brazil shows 10 per cent to local taxes, with $565
million in book values.
1. Sec Appendix, Table D.
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Providing new industry with a ready market is a val-
uable inducement for investment. Argentina's U. S. com-
panies produced sales of $571 million in 1955, of which
,
$438 million waS from manufacturing concerns alone. Of
this total, over $505 million represented local sales.
Brazil, in turn, saw U.S. companies producing sales of
$687 million in 1955, with $357 million from manufactur-
ing, with $680 million from local sales. By comp arison
Chile had $485 million sales from U. S. companies: $375
million of the total from mining alone, $53 million from
manufacturing. Of this total, local sales accounted for
only $143 million. Of the balance of sales from products
produced by U. S. companies, $149 million in goods were
exported to the united States, $193 million to other
nations. The record illustrates neither the utilization
of readily available markets, or useful diversification
within the manufacturing areas oithe Chilean economy.l
The fight for new industry demands a strong competitive
tactic. Chile showed very little inclination to encourage
foreign investments in the post war period, before 1953.
During the period there had arisen a tendency towardS
self_sufficiency unwarranted by the rapidly expanding
population of that country. Goods such as cement, woolen
1. Earl P. Hanson, New Worlds Emerging (New York, Duell,
Sloan, Pearce, 1949. See Appendix, Table 9.
I
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textiles, tannery products, glassWare, lumber, explosives,
matches, beer, and canned ~oodS, were produced in sufficient
sugar refining, tobacco, soap, perfumes, enamelware,
however, Chile haS embarked on a program of enlightened
quantities to satisfy local requirements. Since 1953,.'
expansion of foreign investment potentials. Under the
new Alessandri government, a further step-up in this
approach has increased Chile'S competitive spirit for foreign
dollars. The dissemination of information about the in-
1
vestment potential in Chile, will, of course, help.
A final point on investments in Latin America is of
considerable interest in evaluating the complete picture.
C. K. Yearley, Jr. discussed Latin American complaints 1n
a recent article with an appeal for some introspection
by the Latin Americans themselves. Since World War Two, he
estimates that nearly $2 billion has been invested by
Latin Americans in various enterprises outside their own
2countries. As was previously stated, reports on Chile's
self investment potential has bcen particularly discourag-
ing due to the fact that the classes with the greatest
ability to save and invest have failed to do so.
This re-
1. "Our Investment Dollars for Latin America?" NC·vlsVJcek.
March 14, 19600 30-3. "Setting the Record Straight.
U.S. NeWS & Vor1d Report. March 14, 1960. 102-4.
2. c.K. Yearley, Jr., "Latinl\.merican Complaints."
Commonweal. LXXI: 20, February 12, 1960, 539.
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flection on Chileans' ability to invest in their own
future has been ascribed to their tendency to expect that
their government will provide the means.
As waS previously stated, the change in Chile's
Chile's Liberalized Investment Laws.
attitude toward foreign investments came after 1953. The
more liberalized attitude stems from the Decree-with-the-
Force-of-Law 437, of February 2, 1954. This legislation
is considered Chile's first post war recognition of its
problem of economic development in the field of foreign
investments.l From its inception, the law has been the
source of much controversey in Chile from individuals and
groups objecting to discrimination towards native industry.
As a result, a modification of this law, August 13, 1956,
by Law 12,034, changed and adapted Law 437, for the pur-
poses of accomodating native industries. This was accomplish-
ed under Article 5, subsection Cd) of amended Law 437, by
repealing subsection Cd) by Law 12,084,:
Cd) The activities, in which capital was
invested, will be exempt from any regime
of price fixing regulation, control, or freez-
ing, provided that, on the date to which
the following paragraph refers, national
activities shall not have been subject to
1
. . 2t 1l.S reg~me.
1. The Chilean Foreign Investment Law was originally
Law 427, Nov. 10, 1953, but was almost immediately
amplified by Law 437.
2. "Foreign Investment LaW and Regulations of Chile."
Economic Reports. World Trade Information Service,
Dept. of Commerce, Part 1, 59-8, February 1959.
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Law 12,084. further clarified "national enterprises" by
permitting them to enjoy the same benefits of similar
foreign industries. In a recent full page advertisement
on busincss advantages in Chilc, the government summarized
the benefits of Law 437, regarding foreign capital:
1. After a minimum five years occupancy in
Chile, foreign capital may be re-exported
in quotas of 20 per cent of the total
annual investment.
2. Investments made in Chile are import duty free.
3. Interests and profits from such investments
may be re_exported freely.
4. Income produced from such investments are
tax free for a period of ten years.
5. Foreign investment enterprises are not
restricted from expansion and development
by price controls and other restrictive
regulations•1
Coupled with Chile's attempt to attract foreign invest-
ment, the Department of Commerce of the U.S. has published
a valuable library on potentials there in its World Trade
Information Service. Examples of the publications provided
are those dealing with establishing a business in Chile, pat-
ent and trademark regulations, pharmaceutical regulations,
licensing and exchange controlS, and the import tariff system.
2
1. "LaW 437, Regulating the Investment of Foreign Capital".
New York Times. Economy of the Americas Section, Jan.
13, 1960, full page advertisement.
2. See the bibliography on Chapter IV, which cites the
proper bulletins on these separate fields.
_____ ...J!
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Each item is explained and amplified in terms of the
implications of existing Chilean laws and the composite
provides an excellent contribution by the U.S. government
towards encouraging U.S. investments in Chile.
A further contribution to understanding the invest-
ment potential in Chile is to be found in the new book
by former Ambassador Merwin Bohan, Investment in Chile.
One of a series of such publications by the Department of
Commerce, prepared to inform U.S~ business interests in
Latin American investment potential, the one on Chile
discusses in fifteen chapters the specific avenues for
investment in the econo~y, their separate economic back-
ground or history, and what the present Alessandri govern~
ment is attempting to do through its new legislation~
According to Ambassador Bohan, the neW government has
forcefullY entered into activity to permit vast structural
reforms in government operations and administration with
expected efficiency and economy. The government has
thoroughly revised its custom duties and import restr.aints
to liberalize investment, created anti-monopoly regulations,
business law and tax changes, and made available wide powers
t f I
" t" t " 1o the president "or app aca ron "0 econom1.c recovery.
The flavor and atmosphere for investment in Chile is
1. Merwin Bohan, Investment in Chile (Washington, Dept.
of Commerce, 1960.) For statisticS, see in Appendix,
tables 10, II, 12, 13.
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encouragingly good.
Chilc's Primary U.S. Investments
In order to evaluate the conditions for U. S. private
investments in Chile, it would be well to conclude this
portion of the discussion with a brief review of the
Chilean copper industry. Since the majority investment
in this country is in the copper industry, the pattern for
other investments will largely turn around its state of well
being, development and growth.
Despite its one product classification among Chile's
exports, copper has become a most fortunate blcssingto an
economy too long dependent upon nitrates. If we consider
iron and steel production as Chile's prime example of new
diversification, we can consider copper Chile's primary
economic crutch. Similar to the Republic's vast natural
deposits of nitrates, Chile possesses the world's largest
copper resources, and second largest world-production of
copper. The utilization of this natural resource is large-
ly in the hands of the Anaconda Sales Company, and its
management subsidiaries. The method and manner of handling
this vast investment on the part of Anaconda, and the
capitalization of the asset by the government of Chile, form
the basic drive behind the economic life of the Republic~
Anaconda itself owns the Chile Exploration Company at
Chuquiemata, and the Andes Copper Mining Company at
Potrerillos, which together produce 83 per cent of Chile's
!
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copper. The £1 Teniente mining operation of Kennicott
Copper (U. S.) produces another 13 per cent. The United
States is presently an importing buyer of copper, with
present U.S. copper producing fields expiring at a rate
soon to place Chile's producing capacity ahead of our own.
Anaconda's primary source of copper for her own purposes
is Chile, not domestic mines in the U.S. The importance
of Chilean copper to both the U. S. and Anaconda is
obviouse
Basic Law 11,828 of Chile, August 4, 1955, literally
revolutionized the copper industry of the country. It is
the basic handiwork of Anaconda, under the direction of
Mr. Roy H. Glover, Anaconda's chief executive and nego-
tiator-trouble shooter. The realistic give-and-take
required between the Chilean government, with its natural
desire for the fullest benefits from its prized resource ,
and the highly skilled, organized know-how of Anaconda's
investment, produced a fruitful copper peace. Writing of
the conclusion of negotiations between the parties,
El Mercurio said:
The fruits of his (Glover's) labor are
incorporated in the Copper Law on which
he worked enthusiastically and with in-
finite patience. On many occasions the
discussions were suspended and seemed on
the verge of crumbling and collapsing.
Then one was able to observe his faith
and character. He would again consult
with his company in search of counter-
balances that would permit negotiation~
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to continue. During the entire period
" fl f a i I lh" ,hJ_S sens e 0 - .ium or never J_ aa ec ~m.-
To the skeptics who would depreciate the value of such
contributions, it is only necessary to refer to the
many references in the Senate Reports on Latin America
previously cited, in which the ability to understand the
Latin American businessman, and his problems, comprises
the one stumbling block few Americans will make the effort
to overcome.
The actual period of conversations on the subject of
a copper law covered the period 1950-1955. The conclusion
of negotiations resulting in Basic Law 11,828, covered
four distinct parts, and eventually affected all forms
of mining in Chile.
Part I: Taxat ion.
An "incentive" sliding scale ranging from 75 per cent
income tax to a flat 50 per cent t ax on the sale of copper
ore was arranged to encourage production. If production
doubled, the flat rate applied. A special amortization
rate was allowed to any new expansion of facilities.
Part II: The Copper Department.
The establishment of a new institution called the
Copper Department was arranged. Its chief minister, holding
1. Isaac F. Marcossan, Anaconda (New York, Dodd, Mead
and Co., 1957) 319. Quotation from newspaper HI
Mercurio, May 23, 1955.
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a cabinet rank in the administration of the President,
heads a committee that operates the Department: with
three representatives of the President; two directors
of the central Bank of Chile; two representatives of the
copper companies; two representatives of the Confederation
of Copper Workers (union); and one representative of the
Board of the National Mining Society.
Acting as a regulatory body, the committee controls
the industry and its operations. The Departments operating
income is produced from a 1 per cent tax on copper sales.
The Anaconda Sales Company became the official sales
agent for Chilean copper. The "best price" theory applied
and was acceptable subject to approval of the Departmento
Part III: Regulation of Labor.
Since Chilean labor engaged in copper mining and
production are paid on almost an equivalent basis to that
in the united States, their wage and benefit basis are of
economic concern to Chile as a whole. While the numbers of
available workers used in mining operations is relatively
small in terms of the total work force, the effects of
higher wages has had a tendency to drive wages up in other
and less important segments of the economy. Due to the
violent changes in the value of the pesos to the U.S. dollar,
and its depreciation, a sliding scale of pay was allowed the
miners in an equitable manner to the satisfaction of the
producers and the union.
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Part IV: Distribution of Taxes.
In a highly technical phase of the law, a means of
permitting the best use of taxes on the industry within
the economy itself was left in the hands of the Department.l
The effects of the Copper Law has permitted Chile to
adjust its economic dependence upon one product, and to
vassilating world prices. Under the "best price" theory,
Anaconda was required to purchase, even its own production,
at certain premium prices. By agreement, one-third of the
Chilean copper production was to be set aside for U. S.
customers based on U. S. domestic prices. Since the full
force of Chilean production had never been placed directly
on the international London Metal Exchange, the Exchange
prices stood at 54¢ per pound during most of 1955, as com-
pared with 46¢ per pound in the U. S. In the spring of
1956, Anaconda Sales Company moved Chilean copper on the
London Exchange and by April, London prices adjusted to
49-3/4¢ as opposed to U. S. domestic prices at 48.73¢.
While neWs of lowered prices was not pleasing to Chilean
ears, they reflected a normal pricing base in terms of world
procluction.2
1. Decree-with-Force-of-Law 11,828, August 4, 1955.
Embassy of Chile, Washington, D.C.
2. New York Times, 3/26/56; Wall Street Journal, 4/3/56,
market quotations.
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The easy road of copper took a drastic detour as a
result of the severe U. S. recession of 1958. Copper prices
Were almost halved within a six month period, and have
barely yielded to an upward trend since then.1 This
situation in metals strongly parallels the copper collapse
in the second quarter of 1949, when prices declined from
223.5¢ to l6¢ per pound. Under its present formula however,
the Copper Department has better adapted the Chilean economy
to the restriction imposed upon its copper exports.
Summary
Chile has always had a favored place in foreign invest~
ment circles among Latin American republics. With the
decline of British investments following World War One,
U. S. investments made rapid advances in Chile to al1time
highs. As was pointed out in another place, the depression
of the 1930's caused Chile to revitalize herself internally
without regard to her loss of foreign markets. The La ck of
vitality in gaining an incentive toward encouraging foreign
investments following the Second World War further tended
to deprive Chile of much needed investment capital. That
the correction in this course of events would be stimulated
internally by dealings with present foreign investors,
such as Anaconda, seemS to fit the pattern of Chilean
1. "Optimism Voiced for Two Meta1s.11 Peter B. Bart.
New York Times. Nov. 23, 1959, 3:1.
2. "Economic Reportsll International Reference Service,
Dept. of Commerce, VII: 26. 1950.
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economic activity during the 1950's.
The lack of diversification of foreign investments in
Chile are evident. That the one product complexion has to
be changed in order to stabilize Chile's economy seems to
have reached the motivating levels of governmental direc-
tion, particularly under President Alessandri. Private
foreign investment in Chile will turn largely upon Chile's
ability to induce the interest of others, based on the record
of her recent accomplishments.
It noW remains to be reviewed what Chile has done for
herself in arriving at further economic development. The
cooperative contribution of the United States in this
development is important. While such cooperation has not
been the design or result of deliberations from foreign
policy decisions, that it did exist is something to the
credit of our government. The record thus produced should
provide our government a plausible example of the valuable
assets created by economic activities with a friendly
government, whose interests are so important to our own
security and survival.
The recommendation made below to the U. S. Senate
express the best available reasoning for modifications of
existing U.S. policy toward business investment in, and
with Latin American countries. They represent a good
summary of the problems, of probable solutions:
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I. A more liberal U.S. import pplicy on primary
products in Latin America which are competitive
with our domestic products would tend to accel-
erate the long run rate of growth of U.s.
extractive investments in Latin America.
2~ A parallel lowering of U.S. and Latin American
taxes on U.S. foreign enterprises would en-
courage additional U.S. extractive investments
in Latin America.
3. Since the U.S., by its adhoc increase in lend-
ing to Latin America over the past three years
has indicated an awareness of this problem
(the need for foreign capital), it would facili-
tate clarity of thought both in this country
and in Latin America if the U.S. adjusted its
policy to give greater de jure recognition to
the need for intergovernmental lending to
Latin America which U.S. policy recognizes
de facto ..
4~ U.S. businesses should be encouraged to expand
their training facilities for Latin American
personnel.
5. U.S. firms should pursue industrial relations
designed with disarming suspicions that have
arisen from distrust in the past.
6. Th~ selection of U.S. personnel for service in
Latin America should be handled on the basis of
qualification for such services, and with a
mind to the personal problems involved where sent.l
This report might well become a welcome handbook for
present and future investors in Latin America, with a
mind to not only improving the investment potential in
this area, but in properly identifying American investors
with bona fide aims of the Latin Americans.
1.
"united States Business and Labor in Latin America."
(Washington, U.S. Senate, 1960). XIV-XVIII. .
CHAPTER V
Economic Development Techniques Employed
BY Chile and Related U.S. Cooperation
To increase the national product, through
a program of economic development, thereby
affording a higher standard of living to
the people of Chile. This implies a fuller
and more intensified utilization of the
nation's resources.l
The capacity for Chilean economic development has been
documented. The relative advantages favoring the increase
of U.S. private investments have been illustrated. There
remains the record of Chilean efforts at economic develop-
ment, beyond those already touched upon, which would
reflect the techniques employed by the Republic in its
own efforts to attain the national goal cited above.
There is a distinction that should be made in the course
of economic development. The Republic of Chile would
consider the capital funds required for the creation of
satisfactory economic conditions a distinct problem from
that of encouraging foreign and native investments in
areas requiring economic development of resources. For
instance, the Republic would consider the need for capital
funds to improve and develop water resources, related
electrical power and its transmission, the expansion of
transportation facilities, as beyond the capabilities of
modern private investors. Government-to-government loans
L. "Basic Objectives of the Chilean Government."(Washington Department of State, 1959) 13.
Chi 1 e.
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and use of internationally available credits would be the
only way open to such tremendous undertakings. On the
other hand, once provided, Chile would be capable of
providing the services necessary to induce foreign, and
native capital, to expand and develop industrial potential,
manufacturing capabilities, and agricultural productivity.
The U.S. to date has not advanced any significant funds to
Latin America in the capital inve~tment area. This funding
job has been left to various international banking agencies
established for this purpose. The previous reluctance of
the U.S. to endorse the Inter-American Bank, incidentally,
is something of an indication of the failure of U. S. foreign
policy thinking to realize the essential importance and
need of capital fundS for exclusive western hemispheric
purposes.
Bearing in mind this distinction in the area of required
fundS, it is possible to turn to the approaches made to
the problem of economic development by Chile and the results
of the techniques employed. It is difficult for Americans
to understand the vast task required to "catch-up" an
economy of an under_developed country. An over-night in-
dustrial revolution is required. Since Chile's economy
is one of the most advanced of the countries in the category
of under-developed, when viewing her efforts and requirciT
ments light begins to dawn on the tremendouS undertaking
ascribed to such foreign assistance.
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Foreword on Technical Assistance to
Under-Developed Areas of the Harlel
Technical assistance as a device for government-to-
government cooperation is perhaps the child of the Uniteel
States. While it is a tremendously all encompassing term,
essentially technical assistance refers to that special
cooperation in the forms of grants of money, information,
personnel and other related devices, providing the special
"know-how" for the accomplishment of specific economic anel
social aims within a country. While the U.S. has been the
parent of this type of assistance and its aims, the U.N.
has provided parallel programs of technical assistance of
its own, for its own purposes.
The United States' Point Four program begun in the
late 1940's, and related indirectly to the Marshall Plan,
is typical of our technical assistance programs. Tech-
nical assistance missions have, during the course of
the post war period, worked in every area of the world,
and directed the implementation of their findings and
programs through unrelated governmental and non-governmental
sponsored financial institutions. Most of these missions
worked in the so-called under developed areas of the World.
The object of their efforts was directed towards the
eventual economic development of these areas. Considering
their importance, the technical assistance programs never
appear to have been directly related to or controlled by
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foreign policy making in the Department of State. Rather
they appear to have been by-products of a general aim to
provide the technical assistance required to produce strong
allies for our military preparedness build-up.
In 1960, the Committee for International Economic
Growth distributed a book prepared by Mr. Paul G. Hoffman
entitled One Hundred Countries, One and One Quarter Billion
pe~pl'e.1 Mr. Hoffman prepares a case for U ..S. participation
in the economic development of the 100 under developed
countries of the world during the 1960s. Calling for the
organization of an International Development.Association
within the framework of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development, the object would be the util-
ization of a vast program of economic aid and technical
assistance to confront the staggering problems facing the
under developed areas of the world. The National Advisory
Council of the United States endorsed proposed membership
and support by the U.S., and President Eisenhower forwarded
this recommendation along with his approval to the Congress,
February 18, 1960.2 In effect, the new emphasiS given
economic development reflects action on the recommendations
from many quarters for a stepped up program by the United
States. Basically, our modest technical assistance allow-
1. Paul G. Hoffman, One Hundred Countries (Washington,
Lasker Fpundation, 1960.
?. "Message of the President to the Congress of the U.S.,
Feb. 18, 1960.11 White House, Jas. C. Hagerty, Press
Secretary.
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ances (in 1954, it represented a part of $875 fuillion
of a $3.5 billion foreign aid budget),1 would noW be
embraced in the larger framework of the International
Ban k , It is the object of the Int~rnational Development
Association, insofar as the U.S. is concerned, to bring
together the diversified and separate programs and funds
created in the area of development, under a more unified
command and control.
In a talk before the conference of the General Syndicate
of Jute Industry, at PariS, in November 1954, Tibor Mende
illustrated the case for accepting the real challenge to
the West __ the economic development of the so-called 100
countries, and advance of the standard of living in these
areas. The West had reached its present levels of pro-
duction and living standards from three factors that
produced our industrial revolution: (1) the puritanic
enthusiasm to save; (2) the existence of an ~repreneurial
class; (3) the availability of an adaptable, mobile labor
force desireouS of an incentive. In facing this challenge,
the West must accept the grim reality that in the undcr-
developed areas of the world little more than 5 per cent
of national income is saved, or can be saved. In most
areas the state alone represents the only entrepreneurial, -
1. Harold E. Stassen, "Case for Private Investment Abroad."
Foreign Affairs. April 1954, Vol. 32. 3.
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element available. To further complicate matters, the
labor force in most areas is totally ineffective.l
With the Japanese, Russians, and Chinese the only oneS
seriously encouraging their own industrial ievolutions,
it rests upon the West alone to foment the cause along
Western principles. To meet the challenge of the so-
called state-inspired economic development programs of Russia
and China, the West has turned to economic development assist-
ance and private foreign investment. To reach the modest
levels of a simple 2.5 per cent annual increase in the
standard of living in these areas, a sum equal to nearly
$16 billion would be required annually of the West as a
whole.
In answer to the critics' moans over the over-burdened,
aid_conscious West, and the disquieting fact of u.s.
deficit spending and loss of gold reserves due to post
war foreign aid and assistance, Mr. Hoffman offered the
potentially ripe neW markets of the under developed areas,
if they are given the incentive and means to reach new,
improved levels of
.. 2l~v~ng. With no dispute of the importance
of the cause, or the possible advantage of the new markets,
it remains to be seen if the West, by way of the Intcrnation-
al Bank, can afford the frightful cost of the new program
1. Tibor Mende, "The Under-Developed Areas~ Ii Challenge
to the Vlest." Cross currents. V:2. Sprl.ng 1955.
20 "Maximum Challenge: Is the Economy of Western Horld
Sp1itt in gAp art?" Sat u rc1 ay Rev i ew • J anuary 16, 1960 •
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for international technical assistance.
The .E;~ample of Chilean Self-Developmcnt
As prcviously cited, FOMENTO, Corporation de
Fomento de la Produccion, was established in 1939, by the
Chilean Congress to handle its economic development.
Created out of the crisis arising from disastrous earth-
quakes of January, 1939, FOMENTO was given the job of
rebuilding the cities of Concepcion and Chi1lan, and
their immediate vicinitieso
Development programs were not new to Chile~ The
Central Bank of Chile had directed similar projects and
programs from the time of its revised, liberal Constitu-
tion of 1925. Specifically, the Industrial Credit Fund, the
Mining Credit Fund, the Agricultural Credit Fund, the
Agricultural Settlement Fund, and the Peoples' Housing
Fund, were all programs related to economic development
prior to FOMENTO. While FOMENTO represented direct in-
tervention of the government into the affairs of the
economy, the expressed objectives Was to develop private
enterprise, by aid to private capital ventures. The
Government, under this plan, was to be first a shareholder
in the venture, then, retiring and liquidating its invest-
ment when stability and production allowed the government
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was to return to a non-participating status.1 By 1951,
FOMENTO had under this plan of action rebuilt Conception
and Chill an, created a neW iron and steel industry at
Conception and Huachipate, oil drilling at Tierra del Fuego,
mining development of manganese and coal, the development
of new industries of fabricating, textiles, with related
programs for agriculture, forestry, the wine industry and
hydro-electric expansion.2
The results of FOMENTO'S efforts to.1951, were not
unimpressive. The iron and steel industry at Huachipate,
had reached a level of 200,000 metric tons production
annually. The manganese industry, so essential to the
u.s. during the Second World War, shipped over 120,000 tons
to the U.S. alone in 19510 Existing hydro-electric facilities
stimulated by FOMENTO, generated 153,000 kw in 1951; and
new stations under construction at the time at Los Cipreses
and Calafquen were expected to provide an additional
234,000 kw annually. The wind industry, which had develop-
ed fame in Latin America for its quality, had developed a
a new export market, with 75 per cent of its production in
1951 going to France and Belgium. In conjunction with a
1. H. Finer, The Chilean Development Corporation (Montreal,
International Labour Office, 1947) New Series #5.
2. "Fomento.'1 Chile Today. (Ne\'l York, Hamilton Hright
Organization, February-March: 1951).
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u.s. Agriculture mission, FOMENTO laid the plans for a new
lumber industry capable of producing an estimated 75 million
board feet by1962. The textile industry, enjoying new equip-
ment from credits arranged by FOMENTO in the U.S. in 1949,
had increased the production of cotton te~tiles over 50
per cent of the 1937 levels bi 1951. Santiago with 144
mills, Valparaiso with 18 mills, and Concepcion with 9
mills, became new centers for this industry. In the field
of public housing, FOMBNTO directed the Peoples Housing Fund
to build 2000 additional dwellings in 1948, and 4650 in
11949.
Technical Assistance Devices Employed by
Chile Since 1950
The 1949-50 Economic Mission of the United Nations,
which had been requested by the Chilean government to
study its economy, had recommended strong controls to curb
the Republics' disastorous inflation. Little or no attcn-
tion was given to recommended devices in this field prior
to 1956, when the problem had developed to even greater
p r o p o r t i. o n s , The Mission's other recommendations for
administrative reforms, balanced budget, controlled
fiscal policy, and tax reforms remained unchallenged until
the advent of the Alessandri administration in 1959.
Despite the inaction of the Ibanez administration to
1. Ibid., "Fomento." Chile Today.
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implement the Mission's fiscal recommendations, its activities
in the field of economic development through technical
assistance programs Were important enough to contribute
to the pattern of self-help begun by previous adminis-
trations.
Chilean Agricultural Development
The commonly accepted opinion of the Chilean economy
is that is is primarily a mining country. The fact is that
the largest percentage of her economically active popu-
lation is engaged in agricultural pursuits. Despite
Chile's rapidly expanding industrialization and a record
of declining importance placed in agriculture by Chilean
workers, an estimated 30 per cent of the work force is
still engaged in farming or agricultural pursuits of one
form or another. Not only because of the dependence of
a large sector of the population for livelihood in th~
area, but because of the rapidly increasing demands for food
products from agriculture, the Chilean government made a
request, in March, 1951, for an independent mission to
study and analyze the agricultural problems of the country.
This request to the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations, was honored with the arrival of a
highly qualified team of experts, whose report is one of
the best records available of proposals arising from a
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technical assistance group.
During the depression of the 1930s, vast numbers of
Chilean agricultural workers moved in search of better
paying city jobs. The resultant slip in agricultural
production continued on an annual basis until 1940, when
Chile lost her self-sufficiency levels of production. In
terms of Chilean imports, the 1935-39 average of agriculture
imports represented 12.3 per cent of total imports, These
increased to 29.3 per cent of total imports by 1953-56.1
This rise in demand for agricultural imports to satisfy
consumer needs in the country drained off the much needdd
exchange surpluses gained during beneficial trade years.
Becaus2 of the economic potential of Chilean agriculture,
the rapid rise of import demands in this area and the de-
clining productivity amounted to a national disgrace.
The Bank-FAO Mission provided the Chilean government
with a blueprint to activate this sector of the economy:
1. To provide general measures capable of in-
creasing gross agricultural production
33.5 per cent above the 1945-49 levelS.
2. To develop a consistent long-run policy
which would instill confidence in the farmers.
3~ To initiate temporary per capita consumption,
to afford lead time for the program to take
effect.
1. "Basic Data on the Economy of cn i i e ," Economic Reports.
World Trade Information Service, Dept. of Commerce,
Par t 1: 59-15. 4- 5• 1957 •
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4. To permit a general rise in farm products.
5. To revise the rate of exchange policy and
import controls along with the new agricultural
policy.2
The Mission established 1960, as the goal for accomplish-
ing its initial objectives for catching up production.
Under a projection for the period 1952-1960, the Mission
expected the Chilean population to increase 23 per cent
to an estimated 6.93 million people. Per capita consump-
tion was eJ~pected to increase 36 per cent during this period.
In order to meet this demand, agricultural production had
to increase on an annual rate of 3.12 per cent to 1960,
to catch up the tardy production. After 1960, a 2.5 per
cent annual increase would permit Chile to keep pace with
her demand for food.
In order to accomplish this formidable task, Chile
was required to reclaim some 600,000 hectares of land
(about 1.5 million acres) which remained fallOW, or re-
qui red drainage or irrigation. The Mission outlined a
thorough program for improving production through new
machinery and fertilizers, and animal husbandry programs.
Related fieldS called for increased fish production to
off~et meat demand; an enlarged forest exploitation pro-
gram sufficient to conserve this neglected national re-
source and develop a new wood processing industry.
1. The Agricultural Economy of Chile. (Washington,
International Bank & F.A.O., 1952).
I
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Responsibility for directing this program was placed
in the hands of a neW Agricultural Development Committee,
directly responsible to a modernized Ministry of Agricul-
ture. A Land Improvement Institute Was to be established
to direct on-the-spot educational programs, along with the
authority to encourage the development of medium sized
family farms by the use of newly provided credits. The
government was assigned the task of providing special
assistance for required irrigation projects; to develop
a much needed highway system and railroad program to
permit improved transportation of goods from farm to
market; and to e;~pand the processing of foods and
marketing facilities industries in order to make full
~e of the delivered production.
As of 1959, little had been accomplished by the
Chilean government to realize the goals established by the
Bank-FAO Mission. Inflation, financial difficulties, lack
of program coordination. the system of land tenure, and
the reluctance of land owners to accept change have been
given as reasons for the inaction. Ambassador Behan
(than) in any other
greater monopoly of agricultural land
1country of the world." Of .f h c total
cited Chile with Iia
available land devoted to agriculture, he reports that
1.. Bohan, Investment in Chile. See Chapter V.
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only 3 per cent of the farms represent 55.3 per cent of
the land farmed, while 4.7 per cent of the farms represent
80 per cent of the land, and 9.6 per cent of the farms
represent 91.2 per cent of the land. The problem between
these vested interests and the government's national needs
must be resolved.
The area of Chilean arable land per capita places Chile
in a most favorable position among the family of nations.1
42 per cent of Chile's land area consists of agricultural
1 and: of the 30.8 million hectares involved, 36 percent
is cultivable; 64 percent is pasture. Forest or wooded
lands comprise about 28 per cent of total land
2a r a a ,
The Alcssandri government has prepared the following
items in its program for agriculture. They properly con-
sider the recommendations of the Bank-FAO Mission.
1. Development of irrigation works and the
utiliZation of ground waters.
2. A new grant of $2 million credit for the
introduction of imported breeding cows
to improve cattle population; a similar
grant is considered for dairy cattle.
3. To improve yield, a new system of bonuS
on fertilizers used during a given year.
4. Additional foreign credits obtained would
be devoted to the import of agricultural
machinery.
1. See Appendix, Table 14.
2. "Relations between the Unitecl States and Chile,
1952-59." Jorge Burr, ~!inister Counselor (Hashington,
Embassy of Chile, 1960.)
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5. Government financing of new processing
facilities to accomodate the livestock
and dairy industries.
6. The addition of a third beet sugar plant
to permit additional production to satisfy
30 per cent of the present domestic con-
sumption.1
To accomplish these goals, the government budgeted
14 million escudos for1959, and 15.1 million escudos
for 1960 (as compared with 5.9 million escudos in 1958).
u.s. technical assistance to Chile in the agricultural
sector has represented one of the largest parts of the
budget allowed the Republic. Under the direction of the
International Cooperation Administration, the agricultural
sector has been labeled "Plan Chi1lan" and received about
30 per cent of the I.C.A.'s funds employed in Chile:
I.C.A. 's budget being $803,000 for 1957, $973.000 for
1958, and $385,000 for 1959. The I.C.A. directs the National
Agricultural Training Center, which carries on projects
for weed and pest control, introduction of improved plant
and livestock species, development of farm-to-market roads,
forestry conservation, soil and water control, irrigation,
introduction of better farming toolS, techniques of
artificial insemination, improved farm management, and
2supervised credit.
1. "Relations etc." Jorge Burr.
2. "ICA Programs -- Chile." 0lashington, International
cooperation Administration, 1959).
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Transportation facilities are considered directly
related to agricultural development. The I.C.A. devoted
10 per cent of its 1959 budget for Chile (about $254,000)
to this need of the economy. In turn the Chilean govern-
ment doubled its 1958 budget in the transportation field, with
69 •7 illi11 ion esc u dos (1959) an d 7 1 •3 mill ion esc udos (1960)
directed toward improvement and development. A renewal
program has been planned for the Chilean railway system
over a five year period, at an estimated cost of 234 million
escudos, to permit the updating of 1,000 kilometers of track,
introduction of a new signalling-communications system, and
the addition of 5,000 freight cars, 700 coaches, baggage,
and track motorcars, and 80 locomotives. Under present
plans, the Chilean railway system will be prepared to
accept her developing industrial production and agricultural
goods for prompt and efficient distribution. Technical
assistance training programs are aiming at rail efficiency
by reducing the cost of operations by 15 per cent, increas-
ing the return per man hour of work by 70 per cent, increas-
ing cartage capacity 42 per cent, without increasing either
charges or rates.l
1. "Tt eLat Lo n s etc." Jorge Burr. See Appendix, Table 15.
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Chilean Development of Natural Resources
Before dealing with technical assistance devices and
economic development aid used by the Chileen government
for industrial development and diversification, it would be
well to examine the utilization of the national resources
required to support such industries. During the period
1939-50, FOMENTO had made noticeable steps in its approach
to the problem of the utilization of land resources.
Th rou gh its ef So r t s , th e In terna ti ona1 Bank furnishe d a
twenty year $13.5 million loan, in 1948, to Endesa
(Empresa Nacional de E1cctricidad, S.A.), electrical
subsiderary of FOMENTO, for the development of electrical
power and water facilities. Since this enterprise was to
produce side affects for agriculture, the Bank further
provided $2.5 million for six and a half years to purchase
farm equipment.l
A 1951 loan from the Bank to FOMENTO, for $1.3 million,
was directed to the exploration and use of underground
water resources in the Rio Elqui Valley, near Santiago.
Because of the uncertainty of water supply for the irriga-
tion canals serving this area, only 20 per cent of the
50,600 acres available was available for CUltivation even
in gooc1 y e ars , Land development in this area as a result
of this loan Would permit the full use of present land,
1. "Statement of Lo a.ns v " (Washington, International Dank
for Reconstruction and Development, Sept. 3, 1948).
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and the irrigation of an additional 21,000 adjacent acres.
Another power facility loan from the International
Bank in 1956, was directed to the construction of a new
68,000 kw capacity hydro-electric plant at La Isla, on
the Cipreses River; addition of two generating units
with 49,000 kw capacity at Abanico power station; and
the construction of a new 48,900 kw capacity plant on
the Huanehue River. This $15 million loan will provide
166,000 kw capacity as a part of a FOMENTO-ENDBSA program
to provide Chilean industry with 400,000 kw additional
power. Steel mill expansion, metallurgical development
plants, pulp and paper mills, and expanding textile
industry require tremendous electrical potential* One of
the most recent International Bank loans to Chile was
announced December 30, 1959, for FOMENTO-ENDESA. This
$32.5 million power loan will finance a 280,OOOkw capacity
plant with resevoir dam to serve the Santiago-Valparaiso
area; and for the construction of a new thermal plant at
the port of Huasco, in northern Chile, for current require-
t t Cl . 1 ' . . 1men··s a 11 e s neW 1ron ore m1nes.
Financial assistance extended Chile through the
Export-Import Bank, 1946-59, has totaled $197.5 million.
The Bank has acted as agent for the I.C.A. in acquiring
1. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Press Release 262, Oct. 10, 1951; Release 463, Nov. 1,
1956; Release 616, December 30, 1959.
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an additional $42.5 millions. Most of these loans have
been used to purchase capital goods required in projects
designed for economic development in Chile, details of
h i h·· Iw 1C w1l1 fOllow.
Chilean Industrial Development
Considering the extensive programs carried forward
by the Chilean government during the 1950s in the area
of natural resources, it is apparent that decisive steps
have been taken to provide a substantial base for the
development of diversified industrial interests in Chile.
Perhaps the best example of new industry is that of
Chile's important steel industry. Since 1946, the Pacific
Steel Company (CAP) has annually increased ore and steel
production to a point of impressive importance among Latin
American industries. During this period, $30.5 million in
loans through the Export-Import Bank have permitted the
purchase of mill equipment, building of a new ferromanganese
plan t, a 110 t st rip m i11, strip roll i ng , and 0pen h ear th
facilities. Operational standards of Pacific Steel have
a capacity of 430,000 metric tons of steel bars annually.
In 1959, Pacific Steel together with the Koppers Company
1. "Statement of Operations." (Hashington, .Export-Import
Bank of Washington, June 30, 1959.) See Appendix,
tables 16, 17, 13, 19, for statements on development
loans.
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of C11i1 e , ap p Li edt 0 the Ex p0 rt-Imp 0 rt B ank for a new
$68.3 million loan for expansion and replacements during
the period 1959-64, with plans to reach a capacity of
650,000 metric tons annually. A new mine operation for iron
ore at £1 Algarrobo, has recently been purchased as part
of this expansion program.
Other important development programs are directing the
expansion of the textile industries, chemical facilities,
particularly those related to the nitrate industry, develop-
ment of a new wood-paper industry, expansion of the Chilean
wine industry. Most will be carried forward by native and
foreign capital. By 1960, the copper industry will have
completed its $154 million investment program begun in
1954. An Export-Import Bank loan has been placed with the
nitrate industries to permit a $32 million development
program. Foreign credits totalling $30 million is expanding
the facilities of the Chilean Telephone Company. The Chil e an
government expects an additional $200 million in new
exports from these expansion programs within the next five
ye ars (1965).1
Non-Governmental Technical Assistance in Chile.
A seldom recognized area of important technical assist-
ance cooperation comes from non-government sponsored
organizations. It is important to include here those U.S.
1. "Relations etc." Jorge Burr. See International Bank
Press Release 490, July 24, 1957; Release 337, Sept.
10, 1953, on loans.
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organizations active in Chile during this period, and
their contributions.
James G. Maddox has reviewed technical assistance
cooperation through religious agencies in his presentation
for the National Planning Association. Latin America
was the object of this study because technical cooperation
programs had been under way in this Hemisphere longer than
elsewhere (in 1955). In crediting Chile as one of the most
successful centers for technical assistance in Latin America,
the author cites these results:
1. An agricultural extension program and
demonstration farm near Tenuco, under
Methodist direction.
20 A Clinic, social center, and farm with
a boarding school (Bl Verg(1), near
Angel, operated by Methodist.
3. Mother & Child Maternity hospital in
a workers' section of Santiago, run
under the direction of Methodist.
4. Sweet Memorial Institute in Santiago,
providing a social service center and
training school for Christian leaders
under Methodist direction.
5. A primary-secondary school with boarding
facilities (boys and girls) at 'I'umu ce
with Baptist direction.
6. A primary and secondary boarding school
for girls in Santiago, sponsored by
Methodist as a separate institution.l
1. James C. Maddox, Technical Assistance by Religious
Agencies in Latin America (Chicago, University of
Cfi'ic'ago Press, 1956.)
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The HI Vergel farm is one of the most successful
agricultural training centers in Chile, and a source of
valuable e~perimentation in its field. The attached
school has graduated 225 students since 1921.
In a related presentation sponsored by the National
Planning Association, Arthur T. Mosher deals with tech-
. 1n~ca_ assistance in the field of Latin American agriculture.
While not specifically related to non-governmental groups,
his review is a contribution to the discussion at point.
The object of the Mosher work was to determine what projects
would be considered successful, and which would not. In
terms of resourcefulness and adaptivity, Chile was acknow-
ledged as the recognized leader among Latin hmerican countries
in utilizing the assistance programs provided, both in
Chile, and other of the republics inviting Chilean particip-
at io n , Among thc successful programS enumerated in Chile
were thc St. Vincente' agricultural training center
(developed under O.A.S. direction); the use of an P.A.O.
training program, 1951-54, in which Chile made an
out stan din g recor d ; pro gram sus in g an are a appro achat
1
Concepcion in both agricultural and health fields.
The Maddo~ report did not touch upon devices used by
Caritas International, outlet for international Catholic
1. Arthur T. Mosher, Technical Cooperation in Latin
American Agriculture (Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1957).
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Relief Services, in Chile, simply because the statistical
information required was not available in 1955. However,
during the 1957-58 period, Caritas provided Chile with
86 million pounds of food, clothing, and medical supplies.
As a result of this contribution, Caritas Chile was organized
to permit the distribution of these materials in needed
a r e as. 2,500 social welfare depots were established as
distribution points to accomodate this 1work. The perman-
ency of Caritas Chile in learning how to perform efficiency
needed social services is the specific hope of Caritas
International.
Klein-Saks Economic Mission of 1955-57
Before concluding this section on technical assistance
devices employed by the Chilean government, it is important
to consider one last important activity of tremendous
co nseq u en ce tot he It epub 1ic• Without the efficient ad-
ministration of governmental affairs from which the entire
economy receives its direction, it would be improbable that
any positive accomplishments would be realized in any sector
of that economy. As has been indicated, little was done
by the Ibanez administration to implement the Economic
Mission (U.N.) report of 1951 in its recommendations for
1. "Your Charity, Their Hope!" (Ne w York, Catholic Relief
Services, 1958).
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national savings, credit controls, or administrative reforms~
In an effort to obtain on-the-spot assistance in matters
affecting the direction of the government and its operations,
the Chilean government retained the firm of Klein and Saks,
Washington management consultants, to work in Chile on these
matters.
The Klein-Saks Economic and Financial Mission began
its work in Chile, in November 1955, and prepared two annual
messages to the Chilean Congress (November 1956 and November
1957) pertaining to recommendation for improved government
management. This Mission's final report has been called the
"Chilean Stabilization Program," a masterpiece of obser«
vation, reporting, and suggestions, and a primary record
among important technical assistance reports. The Mission
requested major policy changes in six vital areas of the
government and economy:
1. Government budget and finance: primarily to
bring an end to government inspired deficit
spending, as the primary contributor to inflation.
2. Public administration: initiate a program to
curb government employment, and to coordinate
the overgrown government organization, with
the desire to raise the degree of flexibility
of the administration of government byimproved
efficiency, with consequent savings.
3. Wage policy and social security: Since the
present system of automatic, obligatory wage
adjustments has only contributed to inflation,
and benefited only the top levels of employment,
it shOUld be reformed in such a manner to permit
a free wage policy that is required of a "free"
economy.
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4. Credit: The government has employed credits
in the past for import and inventory speculation,
the worst policy that could have been fOllowed.
Strong curbs on the Central Bank's credit powers
Was recommended.
5. Prices and subsidies: The present system
of price supports and subsidation having
only lead to hoarding and abuses, the Mission
recommended the establishment of a free price
system on the widest base and range of commod-
ities. Inflationary control can be attained
through credit controls.
6. Foreign exchange: In order to completely
reform the exchange system, a single flexible
rate of ex ch ang s for all merchandise
transactions would be desirable, with a
single list of approved imports available
to all foreign competition, without the
use of any quota system.l
The Mission listed the following obstacles in Chile's
economic future, Some of which seem a refrain on earlier
reports:
1. Chile is too far removed from most world markets.
2. Her geography makes communications difficult both
within the nation, and without.
3. A small internal market is unable to provide the
country with the full benefit of modern mass
prociuction.
4. Chile is creating Some of her own serious obstacles:
(a) a large group of citizens identify their
interests with a particular economic group,
and are indifferent to the problems of the
nation as a whole;
1. "Th.::::Chilean Stabilization Program." (Santiago,
Central Bank of Chile, May 1958).
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(b) for two decades or more, too much reliance
on the government to accomplish economic and
social ends has created a bad social trend.
In the section reviewing the 1959 accomplishments of
the A1essandri government, and its 1960 prospects and
budgets, many of the items in the Klein and Saks Mission
are found amplified and activated. The tendency to im-
plement this important report by the present government
is a good sign for Chile, for the future of its economic
development.
The exact manner in which the Chilean government
expects to accomplish economic stability has been out-
lined in the following four-point plan, much of which
embraces the concepts and recommendations of the Klein-
Saks Mission:
1. Stabilization of the cost of living:
In an effort to stabilize the index of consumer
prices, it is hoped that price increases will
not be justified by the producer, importer, or
merchant (operating within a free economy system).
The government will do its part by,
(a) retaining taxes at present levelS;
(b) making no changes in social security
contributions;
(c) maintainence of custom duties and taxes
at present levels;
Cd) and wage adjustments will be permitted
in proportion allowable without price
rises.
In view of the neW stable currency program, a
consumer protection program is now in progress
in Chile.
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2. Wage adjustment policy:
The government has a stated policy on wages,
adjustments only within e~isting price levels.
As a supplement, relief from new taxes and
a t:lore equitable distribution of the tax burden
will be affected in a new Tax Code. While working
toward a balanced budget, the government will
retain an aggressive development program through
short and long term credits, and avoid further
debt or printing of additional currency. These
forces should stabilize wages.
3. Controls on other inflationary factors:
Theplacing of limits on the Central Bank of
Chile will curb the issuance of new notes or
coins, and a requirement for meeting the national
budget in real terms, not by debt. The purpose
here is to maintain the stability of the new
escudo as the essential part of the control of
inflationary factors.
4. Incentives for increased production, efficiency:
Since 'economic stability is the most effective
tool for creating conditions that will allow
the economy to develop with the speed requir-
ed by th increase in the population and
aspirations for a higher standard of living, t
the government expects to encourage the develop-
ment of production through reduced costs in
this sector and creation of new employment by:
Ca) reducing prior deposits and import
charges, thereby lowering costs of
raw materials and equipment required
by industry and agriculture;
(b) the usc of external credits for capital
imports;
(c) making special grants for improved
breeding stocks and seeds for agriculture;
(d) a bonus on fertilizer used to increase
agricultural productivity;
(e) a new credit system to benefit producers,
and USe of a medium credit system through
commercial banks in the country.
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5. Other internal reforms:
The reorganization of public administration is
being carried forward with higher efficiency in
each area. Each state enterprise is now dependent
on its own resources to finance its programs.
An Interministerial Committee has been formed to
permit the coordination of public investment.
With price controls dropped, private investment
encouraged and monopolies combated, the govern-
ment hopes to gain the confidence of the people
of Chile in ;;ainin;:;economic stability.l
Uhil, two brief ~~y c ars errorts of the Alessandri 1 •aCLm~n-
istration can not be e~pected to produce immediate results,
the government reported as of September, 1959, that ex-
change reserves had risen from $10 million at the beginning
of the year to $93 million. While much of this reserve
represents the 1959 gains in foreign credits, their uti1iz-
atioD by the Alessandri administration reflects a more
rigerou5, planned control of these valuable assets than
at any time since the Second Hor1d ~'iare
u.s. Opinion on the Use of Technical
Assistance Programs by Chile.
The record of Congressional opinion on the use of
technical assistance devices and financial cooperation
in the Hcstcrn Hemisphere is ex t en si.ve , Largely it rc-
presents an ox p ress i on of satisfaction w it h the results,
1. "n.elations Between the united States and ciu i e ,"
Jor~~e Burr, 17-20.
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confidence in the gains made in the many areas involved.
Most of the Congressional investigatory committees and
missions involved in the examination of the facts viewed
the needs of the area as requiring a new consistent and
long r an gc technical assistance program from the U.S.
The 1953 Capehart Mission had as its objective the
ex ara i.na t Lo n of the effects of .E:::port-Import Bank and
International Bank loans toward furthering the economic
development of Latin America. In complimenting the
accomplishments in the areas, this Mission called for
a stepped-up program of better coordinated cooperative
projects that would be of direct benefit to U.S.-Latin
American relations and trade. The Missions report called
particular attention to the request of the Chilean govern-
ment for liberalization of the two banks' lending policy
requiring government guarantee .for each "private" invest-
ment loan requested. It was the contention of the Chileans
that this policy forces upon a government participation
on lower levels of economic development properly left to
. t . 1pr1va·-e entcrpr1se.
Technical assistance Was reviewed by a House committee
in 1956, in hopes of a closer coordination of existing
1. "Study of Latin American Countries." (VJashington,
U.S. Printing Office, 1954) for Senate Committee
on BankinG and Currency, 83rd Cong., 2nd Session.
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and projected programs. Since technical assistance programs
generally nrc the forerunners of requests for economic
development loans, this committee felt that more efficiency
in the direction and management of the technical assistance
programs was to bc desired. There has been a general
tendency in U.S. programs to use the crash-approach in
dealing with foreign economic problems. The committee
found duplicating, over-lapping, budget-jealous activities
proceeding on similar projects within the same country.
In praising the convincing job of U.S. technical assistance
in developing a low-cost housing program and preventive
medicine plan in Chile, the committee reported a Chilean
government request .for unification of that country1s
programs under one single responsible representative of the
u.s. governmcnt, rather than the existing separate and
independent direction of field personnel.l
In early 1957, former am bas s ad 0r D avi dr:. Bruce
submitted a further report on technical assistance and
foreign aid programs to the Senate. On stressing the
importance of encouraging private investment in Latin
America through special tax legislation from the Congress,
Mro Bruce emphasized the contribution exchange programs
of personnel and utilization of surplus U.S. goods would
1. "United States Technical Assistance in Latin America."
(Washington, U.S. Printing Officc, 1956) for Committee
on Governmcnt Operations, House, (34th Co ng ;, 2nd Session.
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be as part of our program. The Bruce report, unfortunately,
re comrn cn d ed an expansion of our military assistance pro-
gram in Latin America, a suggestion representative of an
official attitude in the Executive branch of our government
soon to be rejected and reputed as valueless in our program
1of economic development for Latin America.-
The inaction of the U.S. to clarify an official, long
term and long range economic development program for Latin
America is much overdue. And it is most interesting to hear
from an individual working in an independent, non-government
sponsored technical assistance group in Chile, that one of
the really tragic consequences of U.S. programs is the fail-
ure to project any real image of ourselves or related
principles of a philosophy of American life:
Americans are often accused of being mater-
ialistic~ We are surprised and hurt and
point to our generosity in helping other
nations. Those who receive, however, are
convinced that w e believe we .c an buy their
allcgiance with our gifts. tharity, there-
fore, is not enough. Our foreign policy
should include the preaching of the et~ical
creed upon which our prosperity rests.'
Summary of Economic Development Techniques
betveen Chile and the United States.
The evidence is clear of Chile's efforts to u t i Li.z e
1. "South America." OIashington, U.S. Printing Office,
1957). Druce report to special committee to study
foreign aiel programs, Senate, 85th Co n g,, 1st Session.
2. Letter of I,lr.George M. Ko rb , head of Association for
International Development (AID) mission, Santiago,
dated February 27, 1960.
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the best available technical assistance devices for guidance
in directing her economic development. The Republic's
reputation in Latin America for resourcefulness in approach-
ing her economic problems has contributed to the growth of
her role of leadership among the republics. Much of the
failure on the part of the Chilean government to implement
the advice and recommendations obtained from these fine
programs can be laid to the impasse that e~;isted in Chile
between 1952-58, among the political leaders and a rejection
of social responsibility among the classes most capable of
leading the country. This is not a peculiar indictment of
Chile. It is largely the same plight in most of Latin
America, and the entire under-developed area of the
world. The trouble with finger-pointing is that it never
takes into account the contribution made by the responsible
leaders of these societies. The initial beginning of
the Alessandri administration is encouraging. It is
impossible to predict the effect of such leadership during
a short period of time. But evidence presented here will
permit us to expect tllat an improvement is in the making.
An alert foreign policy would permit informed leadership in
the united States to seize upon the opportunity offered in
Chile since 1959, to effectively contribute to the success
of such undertakings. The results could only benefit our
interests, and the cause of the United States in Latin
America.
--~~-~ -- -- ------------,--~~=
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The action of our government to lend support to
the long overdue Inter-American Development Bank, and
to project in 1960, a substantial U.S. Latin American
development program (estimated at ~500 million), is
still insufficient evidence of either the formation of a
long range policy or basic change of attitude in our leader-
ship toward Latin America. In the face of the reports and
studies on this subject, it appears that either the message
they carry, or the serious importance the problems hold for
u.s. inter~sts in the areas have been missed. He can not
hold to prejudice about the failures of others to take
action after advice, when we suffer from the sametribu-
lations ourselves.
The complex techniques employed for economic develop-
ment are astounding to behold. As devices for implementing
our foreign policy, it is obvious that proper administra-
tion of such techniques is the only key to succcssful rc-
suIts for our purposes. as almost every rcport has stipulat-
ed, effective administration depends upon the very real base
of a person-to-person relationship, and something more
than the cold logic of diplomatic parlance. Our ad-
ministrative efficiency must be coupled with a personal
salesmanship reflective of the interests of those with
whom we are dealing. Of all the peoples of the under
developed areas of the world, this last statement is the
only means by which We can be successful in our program
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for Latin America, and most certainly Chile.
CHAPTER VI
Chilean 2conomic Development and Her People
It would not be proper to conclude the discussion
on the economic development of Chile without a proper place
given to the effect it is expected to have on the people
of that country. The cause of the people is inseparable
from those ends desired for economic development in Chileo
Consequently the accomplishments and the basis of the
most serious obstacles to success in the development of
Chile are to be found in the people themselves.
The possibility of removing man from his society is
unthinkable. Out the depersonalization of man in modern
society is most certainly a factor that must be considered.
Perhaps the outstanding feature of Latin America is its
personalism, a virtue We in the united States might do
vJell to recognize, and come to understand. I t is arounel
such a factor that the driving force of Chilean economic
development turns. In the so-called battle for mens'
minds, or whatever might be used to describe the ideological
arguments set forth between the campS of the East and the
West, the proper direction of efforts which reflect an
understanci.ing of the person of the Chileans and not just
cold, bloodless causes of material welfare will come closer
to a mutual understanding than any other technique.
The Chilean Constitution of 1925 is devoted to the
-115-
personal guarantees and statements of rights of the
citizen. But nothing expresses better the concept the
Chilean people have of themselves than the proper considera-
tion given to the "right" to wo rk of every man: that is to
say, the right to emp1oyment~ ,along with the protection of
labor, and the duty of the nation to protect its national
1health. There is a vast difference between socialism
that denies the human right to possess property and social ! I II I I
,
consciousness that conceives a national responsibility of
the people to care for one another. The free society that
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
exists in Chile seriously embraces the latter. For th e
united States to confuse such liberal responsibility as
a weakening deterrent to a free economic society would be
the height of folly. An awakening social responsibility
in Latin America is the only hope a free society has in
bridging the gap of the classes of this Hemisphere.
U.S.-Chilean Joint Social Welfare Projects
Thepub1ic sector in its many important ramifications
as are the problems of housing, health, and education,
will affect national growth. Any contribution of projects
permitting the advancement of the socially unprepared
and insecure must be considered as positive values to
1. The Constitution of Chile, 1925. (Washington, Pan
Americin Union, 1955). See Article 10, Clause 14 (d).
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the economy.
A typical example of such a project is one of the U.S.'s
oldest in Chile. In May 1943, the Republic created a
Health Servicio in conjunction with a U.S. Technical
Cooperation program in the field of public health. Durinpo
the period 1953-60, the I.C.A. has obligated $2 million
in its budget for Chile, to provide health education,
training in preventive medicine and nursing, industrial
hygiene, and rural health demonstration projects. In
related areas, the I.e.A. has devoted 25 per cent of its
$17 million budget during this period in three areas:
$858,900 for housing development; $1.3 million for industrial
training programs; and the $2 million for health. Before
1957, the I.C.A. programs in housing were aimed at self-
help projects, permitting the neW owners to assist in some
way the construction of the new homes. Since that date,
the I.C.A. has broadened the base of its program to permit
the meeting of greater needs and permit the development of
a national housing program. Through the establishment of
minimum standards of design, construction, and liveability,
and a formula for financing, lower cost housing will be made
available for more of the people. Overcoming the rapidly
growing slums of Chile's many populous cities is a major
social problem of the government.
The Alessandri government has prepared a new low rent
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housing decree to permit the development of entirely new
towns for low income groups. As a result of special
tax legislation relief to builders, 10 per cent of the
cost of construction and 20 per cent of the cost at sales
levels have been re du ced , To promote rural hou~ing,
a specialS per cent tax has been leveled on agricultural
profits and its commercial counterpart in order to create
a fund for such construction. The pace of new housing
is approachin~ the post-depres ion years in productivity.
During the past ten years, CORVI, the housing corporation
under FOMENTO, averaged four thousand low cost houses
an nu a Lf.y , During 1959 alone, the corporati6n has under-
construction nearly 32,000 low cost units to fulfill the
government's neW housing effort.l
Chilean Labor
Of all the areas ripe for successful penetration and
gains by the Communists,the area of Latin American labor
ranks in the forefront. Political action through the
union movement presents to the Communists their best
opportunity for creating a record for their cause. While
results have not been primarily the ends of Communists in
the union field, they are ~le to create the best impressions
1 • II n.e1 at ion s Dc tVI eenth e Un itecl S tat es and C11i1e •"
Jorge Burr. Also, "I.C.A. Program, Chile."
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here. In the Senate report on business and labor, previously
cited (1960), particular emphasis w as placed on a proper
consideration of the very vast network of unions e~isting
in Latin America, the importance of their relationships
with U.S. invcstmect interests, and the potential good
American unions could do by initiating e~changc groups with
the important confederation there. In a recent article for
Foreign Affairs, George C. Lodge stated that "the most
important influence on the people (of Latin America) is
the 0 r g an i z at ion af VI0 rk ers •II 1
The Chilean labor movement dates from the mid-nine-
teenth century mutual aid societies created among workers.
The position of labor reflected in the 1925 Constitution
was well advanced over its hmerican counterpart during that
period .. Since unemployment has never been a serious
problem in Chile, it has only been w i th the rise of
inflationary pressures within the economy that labor's
voice has become more and marc vocal.
Chilean trade unions are basically affiliated to a
central union body called CUTCH, Central Unica de los
Trabajadorcs de Chile. Represnnting 90 per cent of the
unionists, about 21 per cent of all the non-agricultural
1. George C. Lodge, "Labor's Role in Newly Developing
Countries." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 37:4, 661. July 1959.
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workers, CUTCH, while a formidable organization, is
basically a loose alliance of conflicting groups.
It is known to be influenced by Communists, and by its
constitution opposed to capitalism and imperialism, but
its eventual direction is no morc settled than its lack of
seriousness about its objectives. If economic opportunities
present themselves and the well-being of the workers allowed,
it is not expected that the Communists will complete any
, ,I
I,)
1 'I
I
successful domination of CUTCH. A healthy and vital labor
philosophy in the U.S.could, if available, contribute
. 1greatly to the guidance of Ch1lean labor.
Chilean Middle Sector
It is not properly understood in the United States that
a rapidly developing middle sector, or middle ci~ss,
is coming into political power in many of the important
areas of Latin America. It is true that great wealth and
gr~at poverty divide much of Latin America. But in
republics similar to Chile, where over 30 per cent of the
population is rightly identified as a middle sector, this
important urban, waged or salaried group is beginning to
impress itself upon the available political leadership.2
1. "Labor in Chile." Foreign Labor Information. (Vlashing-
ton, U.S. Department of Labor, July 1956.).
2. John JQ Johnson, Political Change in Latin America.
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 195~).
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The political identification of Chile's middle sector
is still undetermined. Since the Republic suffers from the
splintering of a multi-party system of politics, the middle
sector has found no cause identified with a particular
par t y , This fact, and the sense of the Chileans as a whole
to support vital leadership, has given strength to an
administration like that of President Alessandri's. On
the other hand, this prevailing weakness of political pur-
pose and a sense of divisiveness makes the influence of
the middle sector less than what it should be within the
Republic, and of course affords the Communists still add-
itional opportunity to divide ~nd conquer.l
The middle sector, along with labor which count strongly
in its ranks, make for the greatest force for improved
s t an d ards of living in Chile. Consequently, the ability
to impose a discipline required for internal stability and
economic growth is all the more difficult. The tendency
of this sector to avoid the necessities of thrift that is
required for internal investment i.s a problem requiring
real political ingenuity.
Communist Cause in Chile
Robert J. Alexander's recent book covers the status
1. John R. Stevenson, Chilean Popular Front (PhilaJelphia,
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942).
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of Chilean communism very thDroughly. Representing one
of the oldest parties in Latin America (one of the two
with original affiliation with the Communist International),
it represents the old story of a small, well disciplined
group capable of exerting pressure beyond their rcpresen-
tation. The party has suffered an outlawed status from
time to time. Decause of the peculiar tendency of Latin
American leaders touse such restrictions on their non-
communist political opponents, such devices have normally
been removed as not in keeping with the democratic process.
Since the Chilean communists have not been able to
allign with the unorganized parties of the left, its
political power has always been limited. As Mr. Alexander
points out, the obvious answer to effective communist
pe n ct r at i on "is a social reform program beginning w i th an
agrarian reform that would establish a firm economic
basis for the political anc1 social democracy" desired
for Chile.l
Summary
The peoples of a free society are the best prepared to
dctermine their future. It is easy to lose sight of the
nccessity of socjal responsibility in an age of machines.
1. Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America
(New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1957~ 210.
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The awesome task of economic development is such that
the mod_rn man naturally turns to the mechanics of statis-
tics to meet the challenge of these insurmountable problems.
Hhere United States' policy is concerned with the economic
development of any area, it must revolve around the firm
base of the peoPle's heritage as the common ground re-
quired for eventual success.
The differences between the Chileans and the citizens
of this country ara frankly not much greater than that
which ex Lst be t w een the Latin Americans themselves. The
Chileans, for example, are 95 per cent European stock.
Their cultural ties have been almost exclusively Europenn.
The traditional pattern of orderly liberal government is a
contrast to the violent picture generally predicted of
Latin America. The resourcefulness and energetic deter-
mination of the Chileans is reflected in the acceptance
of the challenge their over-dependent mineral wealthy
nation has to face.
The peoples of Chile present a really marveleous
society with whom the United States may expect only the
best of friendly relations in commercial and military under-
takings. Our ability to utilize the best available per-
sonnel in conjunction with well-planned programs for ec-
onomic development can lead to expected and realizable
results for Chile and the United States.
CHAPTER VII
Conclusion
The primary purpose of this thesis has been to evaluate
the use of economic development programs and devices as a
means of effectively expressing and implementing United
States' foreign policy. Evidence has been presented to
affirm the value of such programs. This evidence has
been b~sed on the relationships between the governments
of the United States and the Republic of Chile. The reasons
for the selection of Chile, and the period under considera_
tion, 1952-60, have been explained in detail.
One of the principal conclusions produced from this
evidence has been the difference of opinion on the matter
of the value and priority of such programs. The viewpoint
of the United States was described as one evaluating
economic dev~lopment programs in terms of their signifi_
cance in preparinG a country to participate in mutual
security pacts. As a consequence, such programs received
priority in terms of their contribution to an over all
military preparedness plan.
On the other hand, the Chilean viewpoint, which w as
described as representative .f or Latin America as a whole,
is the opposite of this United States' position. The
Chileans consider economic development as a primary and
in itself. It an end essentially tied to any expected
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future of an under developed nation. Further, the Chileans
consider that any program or policies are unwise that
divert attention and emphasis away from long range economic
goals. For in such cases, valuable assets are deprived
from ends required to raise the economic levels demanded
by the people.
The point of departure between the United States and
Chile over the priority and value of economic develop-
II'
" I
1','1
I
ment programs and devices stems from the significance
given military preparedness. On this issue, the United
States position is well known. No summary seems required
here. But in the case of Chile, who has been described as
the leader among Latin American republics on this vital
subject, it is most essential to consider the reasons for
resisting United States' policies on the matter of mutual
security.
Two different reasons may be concluded as forming
Chilean opinion on the matter of mutual security. The
pragmatic reason is based purely on the costliness of
present clay military preparedness programs. It is
pointdd out that technologocal development can depreciate
military standards overnight. The small under developed
nation is ill prepared to contribute scarce functs to such
futile purposes. The new neutralism rising so swiftly in
the Americas carries this argument one step further when
it considers the present armS race the exclusive battle of
Vl0 r 1cl g i an t s •
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Perhaps the more basic reason behind Chilean rejection
of military preparedness programs is the traditional
Latin American resistance to militarism. Here is found
the old and deep seated fear of the misuse of power by
military establishments. Despite the cooperative appear-
ances of mutual security pacts, military build-up of
the individual republics could mean the strengthening of
the status-quo group in power, or on the other hand,
strengthening a group which might upset values too long in
the winning. In any event, the United States' position
on military preparedness among the republics has not con-
sidered the conflict it would engender among our many
ftiends.
Some reconciliation of these divergent viewpoints
has been finally attempted by the United States. As a
result of various important Congressional reports, U.S.
foreign policy towards Latin America has finally begun
to deemphasize various military aspects in favor of a
new emphasis given to economic development. This new
position sees an economically secure Western Hemisphere
as an answer to possible communist penetration. In turn,
the military aspects of security are to be handled by the
concert of nations within the Organization of American
states. Whether this change is merely surface, or reflective
of a serious determination to reflect upon Latin American
needs, remains to be seen.
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This thesis questioned the basic value of economic
development programs. In order to form a conclusive
position on tIle matter, we examined in some detail several
aspects of different types of programs employed by the
Republic of Chile. It was indicated that Chile was a
splendid example for a case study on economic development
techniques and programs. In fact, Chile has one of the
,I'
best performance records and accumulated the longest period
of years devoted to such techniques of all the republics.
The area of cooperation by the United States with
Chilean economic development was sighted both in scope and
degree of financial assistance. Records prepared by the
Chilean government and by various Congressional committees
indicate an impressive result by both parties in this
cooperation. The effects upon the Chilean economy may
not be fully indicated for some years. But the utilization
of the results of past programs, and the integration of
these results in current projects employed by the present
Alessandri government are impressive.
There may be no justification in stating a conclusion
that if the United States had employed more economic develop-
ment programs in dealing with Latin America since 1945,
that our cause, our interests, and our position in this area
would be more secure today. But in view of the apparent
failure of our mutual security approach in the Western
Hemisphere, and in the face of appeals from our friends for
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more serious consideration of economic development assistance,
the road of economic improvement would more certainly
have led to a m or e realistic alliance. The majority view
of Congressional authorities now accept this position.
Based on observations of the relationships between
the united States and Chile, during the period since
\'iorld ~Jar II, the following conclusions may be d rawn as
the results of economic development programs entertained
and employed between the two countries:
1. Economic development programs requiring the
acquisition of investment capital to provide funda-
mental goods and services necessary for the pre-
paration of an industrial economy should e~pect
assistance of international lending institutions,
like the Inter-American Bank, and others, on a
Lo n g term basis. Such loans would be for roads,
clams, w at erw ay s , electrical power, and the like,
the cost of which would be realistically beyond the
ability of private or single government capabilities.
2. A justifiable prerequisite for qualification for
economic development assistance from any resource
should be based on a nation's fundamental economic
potentiality, and its record of past performance
in developing and studying this potential.
3. If a nation has been able to produce a reputation
establishing its ability to attract Single government
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and private investment resources for its economic
development and e~pansion, such a record would
be good evidence of that nation's reliability
and determination to improve itself.
4. Substantial experience with preliminary technical
assistance programs in preparing for economic
development assistance would seem to be one of
the required steps toward economic security.
5. For permanency and stability of both the
technical assistance projects and the economic
development programs, it is essential that
such projects and programs,b~ placed finally in
the hands of a substantially trained and efficient
body of persons in the country expecting such
assistance.
6. In keeping with the concepts of developing res-
ponsible action by the government and peoples in
a free society, the element of independent action
must be allowed and encouraged to nations desiring
economic ~cvelopment and producing a record, similar
to the prerequisites stated.
These conclusions, while appearing to be common sense,
have not been the basis of any guide for United States
action in dealing with the under developed countries of
Latin America. In fact, our economic development assistance
(in terms of our mutual security expenditures) has often
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been applied in contradiction to many of these conclusions.
The United States has entered the 19605 a few steps
ahead of a critical wave of objections to foreign aid
expenditures, The argument on the futility of spending, in
the face of the loss of friends and the decline of our
prestige and leadership, will become more and more force-
ful. It is obvious too that the attempt to form alliances
based on military power with the underdeveloped countries
of the world has proved unsuccessful. In most cases, military
investments of the United States have merely preserved the
status quo. This group in turn has resisted the social and
economic changes demanded for peaceful democratic develop-
mente But, on the other hand, where the United States has
used governmental aid for the purposes of economic develop-
ment programs and devices, nations like Chile have reflected
advancement in handling their serious internal problems,
and come closer to understanding United States views in
other fieldS.
It can be wondered what would be the state of Latin
American affairs if the United States had continued the
degree of contact and exchange enjoyed by our country during
the Second :iorld 'dar. If the office of the Coordinator
of Inter-American affairs had been continued, and a separate,
independent department for Latin American relations had been
encouraged, perhaps the information we gained in 1959-60
from Congressional reports, might have been known and made
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available much sooner. Today the United States faces
the neutralism of Asia and hfrica, already developin~
in countries like Brazil. It is questionable whether, once
started in this hemisphere, the United States can overcome
such a philosophy of government, without an organized and
informed approach similar to devices used during the
period of the last war. The best evidence on this point is
the case established in our use of economic development
p r o g r am s 0
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Table 1:
Chile's Exports and Imports, 1948-57
(Millions of dollars)
Year
194 J
19 t1·9
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
Source: Banco
S an t i a go , Jun e, 19 5 8 ..
Table 2:
Chile's Exports of principal Products in 1957 were, in
thousands 6f dollars:
Total
MineralSManganese with other minerals
Molybdenum
Copper bars
Iron arc
Socliur.1nitrate
potassium nitrate
IodineCopper ores, concentrates, precipitates,
and cement
steel ingots
Silicon-manganese
Fer ro-mang an e s e
Gold-copper ores and concentrates
Gold_si1ver-copper ores and concentrates
Silver-gold concentrates
XVII
453,200
391,413
1,834
3,792
296,301
21,082
41,831
2,353
2 t 824
4,403
1,335
287
1,379
1,752
4,197
4,314
Lead concentrate
Zinc concentrate
coal and carbon black
Crude petroleum
751
130
1,051
1,197
Animal products
untanned hides
Fish and seafoods
Washed and unwashed sheep wool
untanned leather
Beeswax
16,210
297
795
12,402
1,819
897
Vegetables and fruits
Lumber
Quillary bark
Beans
GarbanzoS
Lentils
Onions
Nuts
Fresh fruit
Dried fruit
Garlic
Industrial fibers
Hus}:ed barley
17,920
5,2313
395
3,444
109
2,412
951
459
2,635
661
974
177
447
Industrial products
Fishmeal
Fresh lamb meat
conserved fish
Malted barley
\'J'inesThreads or yarns of linen
ExplosivesIndustrial oils and greases
Metallurgical products
Fabricated copper
Galvanized iron wire
uncoated copperwire
Copper pipes and tubes
26,336
553
968
380
1,744
480
1,289
212
822
17,391
234
436
892
935
6,321__..,_.- .._
other
Source: Ministerlo de Relaclones Exterior, Santiago, Chile.
rnforntation-obtained from "Basic Data on the Economy of
Chilc
ll
OJashington, Department of Commerce, February
1959) Part I, No. 59-15. prepared by Reynaldo F. Rodrigu."
Bureau of Foreign Commerce, American Republics Division.
XVIII
Table 3:
Chile9s imports of principal products ~n 1957 w s
.... ,a ,
thousands of dollars:
Tot a1
Raw Materials
Tin ingots
Gum, rubber, and latex
Washed and unwashed wool topS
untanned cattle hides
Hops
RaW cotton
Industrial fibers
Raw sugarcotton, wool, and silk fabrics
Hemp and jute sacks
Phosphate fertilizersMineral oil, lubricating and industrial uses
Synthetic resins
Ani1inesQuebracho extract and other dyeS
Chemical pulP for manufacturing paper
TallOW and impure animal fats
Wire cables and chains
pipe and tubes
Ball bearings
Chemical products
Iron and steel
Newsprint
coal
Crude petroleum
Diesel oil
Benzene
Paraffin in cakesRectified petroleum for illuminating
Consumer goodSCattle, except breeding
VIhite wheat
Ban an as, coo1cing
Coffee, in grain
'l'e a
Yerba mate
cattle meat
Lard
XIX
in
441,377
132,930
-1,220
1,508
2,531
2,531
476
17, 64S
701
23,968
1,535
1,233
1,225
5,340
1,250
1,066
1,641
3,835
363
898
3,426
1,202
10,205
11,115
1,093
5,026
16,833
4,005
4,322
1,313
6,981
45,838
6,07 8
19
1,145
6,114
6, 608
2,577
1,140
957
Edible oilAutomobiles and station wagons
Tires and tubes for automobiles
Parts and accessories for automobiles
capital equipmentMachinery, equipment, and tools for
miningMachinery, equipment, and tools for
agricultureMachinery, equipment, and toolS for
industryMachinery, motors, boilers and parts
Electrical machinery, apparatus, & material
Tr act ors
TransportMachinery and material for railroads
Trucks and chassis
Busespick-uP trucks and others
9,281
5,282
2,124
4,513
3,391
6,339
66,645
13,603
14,435
6,425
59,725
17,934
25,597
4,906
11,288
92,046
other
Source: Ministerio de Re1aciones Exterior, s~tiago.1
Table 4:
Chilean Exports and Imports by countries, 195
6
-
57
(ThOUSands of dollars)
1956 1957
1956 1957
(EXports)
(Imports)
243,473 189,541
161,483 228,854
242,492 218,803
107,152 132,146
61,002 59,235
40,466 54,685
8 81
321 3,399
1,924 3,911
4,649 3,662
1 22
2,061 661
1,673 1,293
2,116 1,927
11,589 9,150
5,308 5,108
443
695 435
7,517 13,418
6,151 8,930
Country
united states
Europe
Germany
Austria
Belgium
czechoslovakia
Denmark
spain
Finland
FranceT. Information obtained from-"Basic Data on the Economy of
Chile" (\tashington, Department. of commerce, February
1959) Part 1, No. 59-15. prepared by Renaldo F. Rodriguez,
Bureau of Foreign commerce, American Republics Division.
xx
Netherlands
Ita1 y
Norway
portugal
United Kingdom
sweden
switzerland
Yugoslavia
other
Latin America
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Colombia
cuba
Ecuador
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
other
other Nations
Australia
Canada
China
Egypt
India
JapanMalaya, Singapore
other
39, 626
20,710
42
393
92,980
1,449
2,669
465
.......... ---
47,129
30,456
1,792
5,008
1,421
1,998
933
205
383
2,746
1,071
617
496
11,126
932
1,646
1
3,938
..._.. ......--
3,059--_ ...- ..-
1,549
544,220
35,707
21,850
35---~--68,552
3,470
2,078
1
...-- ...........
33,190
18,585
967
5,461
1,233
1,877
1,367
346
460
4,186
2,235
1,540
642
10,946
462
1,073_.,..----
1,698
579
6,273_-----
859
458,200
5,224
5,687
1,115
999
17,420
6,659
6,695
1,101
207
65,292
24,508
592
11,347
399
2,841
1,626
907
1,239
22,015
58
33
86
19,701
33
3,898
812
141
1,950
10,116
2,080
671
353,628
5,965
7,733
315
260
24,883
9,188
4,635
557
4
65,635
16,203
666
11,603
389
5,899
1,498
576
1,498
26,402
542
243
164
14,741
79
4,325
584
409
1,279
6,325
601
1,139
441,377
Source: Banco central de Chile, Boldin, No. 364, June, 1958,
Santi ago•1
Total
Table 5:
Economic production in Chile, 1928-1931.
*In millions 0 peSos, baSed on 1~7~9 average of 100.
For reference, see BllsWOrth, Chil~, Chapter 1.1. Information obtained from rBasic Data on the Bconomy of
Chile" ()hshington, Dept. of commerce, Feb. 1959) Part 1, No. 59-
prepared by R. F. Rodriguez, Bur. of For. Com., Amer. Rep. Div.
Index
Industrial
production
98*
1929
115
XXI
1930
117.5
1931
93
5,965
7,733
315
260
24,883
9,188
4,635
557
4
5,224
5,687
1,115
999
17,420
6,659
6,695
1,101
207
35,707
21,850
35
39,626
20,710
42
393
92,980
1,449
2,669
465
Netherlands
Italy
Norway
Portugal
united Kingdom
Sweden
switzerland
Yugoslavia
Other
68,552
8,470
2,078
1
-"""----------
65,635
16,203
666
11,603
389
5,899
1,498
576
1,498
26,402
542
243
164
65,292
24,508
592
11,347
399
2,841
1,626
907
1,239
22,015
58
33
86
38,190
18,585
967
5,461
1,233
1,877
1,367
346
460
4,186
2,235
1,540
642
47,129
30,456
1,792
5,008
1,421
1,998
933
205
383
2,746
1,071
617
496
Latin America
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Colombia
Cuba
Ecuador
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Other
14,741
79
4,325
584
409
1,279
6,325
601
1,139
441,377
19,701
33
3,898
812
141
1,950
10,116
2,080
671
353,628
10,946
462
1,073
11,126
932
1,646
1
3,938
Other Nations
AuStralia
Canada
China
.Egypt
India
Japan
Malaya, Singapore
Other
Total
-_ ...- ...-
1,698
579
6,273---_ ..-3,059 ------------ 859
458,200
1,549
544,220
Sou rce : B an c0 C entra1 deC h i1e, B01etin, No. 364, June, 1958,
Santiago.1
Table 5:
Economic Production in Chile, 1928-1931.
19311930'19291928Index
93Industrial
Production
117.511598*
*In millions of pesos , based on 19~r'r':2'9average of 100.
For reference, see Ellsworth, Chile, Chapter 1.
1. Information obtained from "Basi'c Data on the Economy of
cn i i e'' (Vlashington, Dept. of Commerce, Feb. 1959) Part 1, No. 59-15. (
Prepared by R. F. Rodriguez, Bur. of For. Com., Amer. Rep. Div.
XXI
Building 62 10.2
Mining
Production 118
Table 6:
Change in Export and Import Totals 1929-32.
8.4 4.1
83 57
1929 1930 1931 1932
Exports 2,293* 1,326 324 282
Imports 1,617 1,400 706 214
*In millions of pesos. 1930 reflected an unfavorable
balance of trade.1
Table 7:
united States Economic Aid to Foreign Areas, 1953-1958:
(In Millions of Dollars)
Grants are outright gifts. (-) Indicates excess of Collection
on Principal.
Area Fiscal 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
1. Western
Europe Total 1,730 790
Grants 1,355 916
Credits - 125 -207
802
918
-116
220
443
_223
36
291
-256
2. Eastern
Europe Total
Grants
Credits
9 5 -5 5
13 10 10
-4 -4 -5 -5 -5
455 457 623 967 918
379 371 640 817 946
19 86 -17 149 -29
3. As ia &
Pacific Total
Gr ants
Credits
4. Africa &
Near East
Total
Grants
154 193
102 158
329
260
333
238
321
268
1. For reference see Ellsworth, Chile, Chapter 1.
XXII
347
193
154
19
2
17
863
772
90
488
348
Credits
5. American
Republics Total
Grants
Credits
35 34
246
30
216
68
102
49
52
30
73
-43
95 53 139
331
117
214
The World Almanac and Book of Facts (New York, World
Telegram & the Sun, 1959) Edited by Harry Hansen.
Table 8:
126
95
31
Book Value of U.S. Investment in Chile with Comparisons:
1929-1956. In Millions of Dollars. -
Country Index
Chile Total
Mining
Mfger
Argentina
Total
Mfger
Brazil Total
Mfger
Petrol.
Mexico Total
Mining
Mfger
Petrol.
1929
423
332
7
332
---s2
194
46
23
683
230
6
206
1940
414
277
7
204-ro
31
358
168
10
42
1946
485
3T3
25
202
78
323
126
45
316
111
66
7
1950
540
351
29
356
161
644
284
112
415
T2T
133
13
1955
639
406
37
447
230
1115
---s65
194
607
154
274
15
1956
677
434
40
470
242
1209
610
213
»75
165
309
18 1
Table 9:
U. S. Compani es Sales in Chile with Comparisons: 1955.
In Millions of Dollars.
Country Total Mfger Mining Petrol Utility Other LocalSales
Chile 485 53 375 27 30 143
Argen tina 571 438 98 12 23 505
Brazil 687 357 299 27 3 680
Mexico 565 316 212 11 20 5* 392
* $5 million in agricultural sales .
1. "U.S. Investments in Latin Ame ri can Ilconomy" (Washington,
Department Commerce, 1957.
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Table 9: Continued.
Country Export to U. s. Export to Other
Chile
Argentina
Br azil
Mexico
149
23
5
138
193
43
2
351
Table 10:
Gross National Production of Chile, 1940-1957.
*In Thousand pesos
Date
Year Total Per Capital
1940
1950
1953
1957
106,318*
157,305
188,298
181,250
21,916
25,984
29,175
25,474
Merwin Bohan, Investment in Chile. Table 1, 11.
Table 11:
Quantum index of production of goods, Chile.
1950 = 100
Year Agric. Fisheries Mining Indust.
Const. Total
1951 96.8 107.3 106.4 117.6
94.9 106.3
1953 95,,7 123.1 95.5 140.1
125.4 116.0
1955 101.6 247 ..1 109.8 143.1
145.4 124.6
1957 97.6 245.7 116 ..0
152.2 63.9 125.9
Merwin Bohan, Investment in Chile. Table 3, 16.
Table 12:
Foceign Investment in Chile, 1953.
In Thousands of Dollars.
1. "U.S. Investments in Latin American Economy"
(Washington, Dept. Commerce, 1957).
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Index U.S. Britain Total
Agriculture 22.5 183.3 1,450
Mining 504,120.0 17,743.0 523,735
Industry 17,789.0 7,403.0 38,616
Finance 1,021.0 3,017.0 5,267
Services 41,231 ..0 29,718.0 72, 825
Commerce 24,442.0 9,909.0 36,076
Tot aLs 588,627.5* 67,975.3 677,971
*U. S.. rep resn n ts - 86..6% 0 f Tot a1 •
Merwin Bohan, Investment in Chile.. Chapter 2, "Foreign
Investment."
Table 13:
Statistics on Economically Active Population, 1952, Chile:
In thousands of persons.
Index
Total:
Total Employers
Males Females Males Females
Salaried
Males Females
Total ...1.616 539 365 145 1,191 371
Mining 99 2 3 <> 0.1 94 2.0
Mfger.276 ..0 131.9 60 60 213 68
Constr. 101 1 14 0.2 86 1
nlectr. 19 0.7 0.2 0 19 0.7
Commerce 166.9 56 83 27 80 23
Trnspor. 89 5 15 0.1 74 5
Services 192 286 22 39 169 244
Other 64 13 8 1 33 6
Agricul. 606 42 157 15 419 19
Fami 1y Worker
Males Females
59 22
29 7
0.4 0.1.
2 2
0.5 0
0.1 0
3 5
0.6 0
0.9 2
22 5
Established from Table 6, U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1957.
New York, Statistical Office of U.N., 1(57).
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Tab1 e 14:
Characteristics of Agriculture .1n Chile, with comparisons
to other regions, 1945.
Index
Area
(Million
Arable
Meadows
Forest
Chile
74.2
hectares)
5.6
12.2
3.6
21.4
Production:
Total (in million
metric tons) 2.3
Per ca.pita (in
metric quintals) 5.4
Per hectare for
a r a b1e & IJ1e ado VJ
1and (met ric
quintalS) 1.3
Total Agric.
Area per
capita:
Total
Arable
Total Agric.
Productive Foods:
(in metric tons)
F ru its
Milk
Meat
Nine
Cereal &
potatoes
\"/001
cotton, tobacco
Beet Sugar
17.3
1.3
5.0
7.2 7.3
0.6
4.4
1.0 19.1
0.7
9.42• .5 0.78
7.6 4.5 5.5
12.2 11.1 39.3
7.5 15.5 20.5
80.6
228.0
160.0
222.0
3443.0 657.0 ~...-
1550.0 2300.0 2784.0 4290.0
183.0 304.0 205.0 631.0
468.0 --- 50.6
1739.0 4731.0 746.0
451.0
11.8 0.6 0.3
133.8
99.5 0.6 0.9
0.5
1939.0 266.0
594.0
2.9
8.8
p. T. Ellsworth, Chile, An Economy in Transition, New
York, MacMillan, 1945.
Table 15:
Investment by Chilean Government, by Function in the
Economy, 1958-1960. In Millions of Escudos.
Function 1958 1959 1960
1.6 1.4 1.1
1.1 102 0.9
7.6 10.1. 11.0
2.9 13.6 13.8
4.7 6.2 4..9
5.9 14.0 15.1
3.1 2.6 1.7
5.8 7.7 8.3
8.0 17.0 17.5
31.3 69.7 71.3
0.7 1.9 2.9
9.8 6.9 6.5
3.1 000
85.6 152.3 153.9
(Propos ed)
Government and High-Level Administration
Protection of persons and property
Public Health and Social Welfare
Housing
.Education
Agriculture and Fishing
Mining
Industry
Power and Fuel
Transportation and Communications
Trade
National Defense
Miscellaneous, unclassified
Embassy ofChile, Washington, February 12, 1960.
Table 16:
Cooperation through the International Cooperation Administration
(lCA) •
I. Surplus Agricultural Commodities Agreement
J~nuary 1955, Public Law No. 480, Title I
March 1956, ditto Title I
1955-59, ditto Title III
1960 (planned) ditto Title III
$5,000,000
34,000,000
36,526,000
17,000,000
II. Technical Assistance Prggrams, 1953-1960. 17,058,000
III. Special Loans
1958, for machinery, products, equipment
1959, for machinery products, equipment
10,000,000
1,500,000
Embassy of Chile, February 1960.
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Table 17:
Other forms of Economic Assistance from U. S. to Chile.
Amount
Agreements
I.
II.
Mutual Defense Assistance Pact.
Development Loan Fund .
Mav 1959 Airport construct10n
Tr~~SUry ~epartment: Exchange Stabilization
1956-1959: renewed periodically. 15,000,000
U.S. Commercial Banks: Exchange Stabiliza-
tion 1956-1959: renewed periodically. 53,000,000
Secret
$ 300,000
III.
IV.
Embassy of Chile, February 1960.
Table 18:
Statement of Loans by International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, September 30, 1959, to the Republic
of Chile (Guarantor).
Borrower Project Date Loan
Fomento-Endesa
Fomento-Endesa
Fomen to-l~ndesa
Electric power
Electric power
Electric power
1948
1956
1959
$ 13,500,000
15,000,000
32,500,000
Fomento
Fomento
Agriculture
Water resources
1948
1951
2,500,000
1,300,000
$106,600,000
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Washington, January, 1960.
Paper & Pulp
Coal Expansion
Coal expansion
1953
1957
1957
20,000,000
12,200,000
9,600,000
Fomento-Others
Fomento-Others
Fomento-Others
Table 19:
Credits of Export-Import Bank of Washington to Chile,
1940-1959. January 1, 1960.
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1940-No. 245. To Development Corporation
To Endesa for electric power
$10,500,000
for agricultural $5,500,000
miscellaneous $17,000,000
1947-No. 411. To Development Corporation
To Endesa for electric power
$2,550,000
for agriculture $3,200,000
miscellaneous $950,000
1946-1957: To Pacific Steel Co. (CAP)
No , 374, 465, 502, 771, 898
1947: Credit to Railways
1950-No. 485. To Department of Public Works
1951-No. 463. To Victoria de Puente Alto
factory, Rayonhil
1951-No. 503. To National Carbide factory.
1956-No. 808, 8 9. To nitrate companies.
1959-No. 1079. To Bank of Chile for
private firms ..
1959-Bank of Chile credit to Madeco, copper
1951-No. 464. To Treasury of Chilee.
1957-No. 937. To Treasury of Chile.
For capital goods.
1958-No. 1010. To Treasury of Chile.
Capital goods for CAP
am on g o t h e r s
1959-Credit to Treasury for investment
budget of 1959 ..
l057-Crcdit to universities for research.
Total Export-Import Bank Credits
XXIX
$ 33,000,000 (paid)
6,700,000 (see 1)
80,550,000 (see 2)
14,000,000 (paid)
1,800,000 (paid)
1,200,000 (paicO
1,150,000 (5 ee 3)
32,000,000
25,000,000
1,900,000
23,000,000 (5 e e 4)
12,500,000
15,000,000
25,000,000
850,000
$273,650,000
1. $500,000 yet to be paid.
2. s 60 million yet to be paid.
3. $500,000 yet to be paid
4. $1 million yet to be
paid
Embassy of Chile, Washington, February 12, 1960.
